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I. INTRODUCTION 
Although sometimes described as war, the fight against transnation-
al jihadi groups (referred to for shorthand as the “fight against terrorism”) 
largely takes place away from any recognizable battlefield. Terrorism sus-
pects are captured in houses, on street corners, and at border crossings 
around the globe. Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, the high-level Qaeda opera-
tive who planned the September 11 attacks, was captured by the Pakistani 
government in a residence in Pakistan.1
 
Abu Omar, a radical Muslim imam, 
was apparently abducted by U.S. and Italian agents off the streets of Milan.2 
And Abu Baker Bashir, the spiritual leader of the Qaeda-affiliated group 
responsible for the 2002 Bali bombings, was arrested in a hospital in Indo-
nesia.3
 
Once captured, these suspects face a host of possible futures: they 
might be deported to their states of nationality; they might be criminally 
prosecuted for offenses under national law; they might be transferred to a 
foreign state for detention and interrogation; or they might be detained for 
extended periods in national detention facilities, like the U.S. facility at 
Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.   
From an international legal perspective, the critical question with 
respect to terrorism suspects who are not captured on a recognizable battle-
field (referred to here as “non-battlefield detainees”) is whether they have 
any rights not available to detainees picked up in a theater of combat. Much 
of the legal discussion on terrorism detainees has uncritically lumped non-
battlefield detainees together with those captured on a recognizable battle-
field, but the context of the capture is significant. International law histori-
cally differentiates between detentions that occur in states at peace and 
those that occur during war. In peacetime, international human rights law 
imposes procedural and substantive constraints on a state’s authority to de-
tain. For instance, any detention must be grounded in law, must not be arbi-
trary, and must be subject to judicial review.4
 
In wartime, the law of armed 
conflict generally applies as the lex specialis and permits states to detain 
persons reasonably suspected of threatening state security, without affording 
  
1  See Erik Eckholm & David Johnston, Qaeda Suspect Sound Asleep at Trail’s End, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 3, 2003, at A1. 
  2  See Richard Owen, CIA Agents Must Be Charged Over “Kidnap and Torture,” Says 
Judge, TIMES (U.K.), Feb. 17, 2007, at 39. 
3 See Dinda Jouhana & Richard C. Paddock, Top Indonesian Suspect Leaves Jail, L.A. 
TIMES, June 14, 2006, at A21, available at 2006 WLNR 10159088; Richard Paddock, Indo-
nesia Arrests Cleric in Bombings, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2002, at A3. 
4 See infra Section II.C. 
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them judicial guarantees.5
 
That expansive authority to detain reflects the 
understanding that, during war, the balance between security and liberty 
shifts. The state’s security interests become paramount, so the liberty costs 
of detaining and thereby incapacitating the enemy are tolerated.  
Since the September 11 terrorist attacks, two dominant strands of 
thought have emerged on the international law that governs non-battlefield 
detentions. One strand asserts that states are at war with al Qaeda and other 
transnational jihadi groups, and that the law of armed conflict thus applies 
to permit the detention of terrorism suspects captured anywhere in the world 
for as long as necessary or until “hostilities” cease.6
 
The poster child for this 
position is Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, who the U.S. government first de-
tained at a secret prison operated by the CIA, and then at Guantánamo Bay.7 
Khalid Shaikh Mohammed views himself as a soldier fighting a war against 
the United States and its allies.8
 
And by U.S. government accounts, his de-
tention and the detention of other high-level terrorist operatives have been 
invaluable to preventing terrorist attacks and saving innocent lives.9 Like 
  
5 See infra Section II.B. 
6 See, e.g., Thomas Hemingway, Wartime Detention of Enemy Combatants: What If 
There Were a War and No One Could Be Detained Without an Attorney?, 34 DENV. J. INT'L 
L. & POL'Y 63 (2006) (applying the law of armed conflict to the detention of terrorism sus-
pects and not distinguishing between suspects captured on or off the battlefield); John B. 
Bellinger, III, Legal Advisor to the U.S. Dep’t of State, Legal Issues in the War on Terror-
ism, Speech at the London School of Economics 7-8 (Oct. 31, 2006) [hereinafter Bellinger 
Speech], available at http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/LSEPublicLecturesandEvents/pdf/ 
20061031_JohnBellinger.pdf (“Al Qaida’s operations against the United States and its allies 
continue not only in and around Afghanistan but also in other parts of the world. And be-
cause we remain in a continued state of armed conflict with al Qaida, we are legally justified 
in continuing to detain al Qaida members captured in this conflict.”); Press Release, U.S. 
Dep’t of State, Remarks of Secretary Condoleezza Rice upon Her Departure for Europe 
(Dec. 5, 2005), available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/57602.htm; John B.  
Bellinger, III, Armed Conflict with Al Qaida?, OPINIOJURIS, Jan. 15, 2007, http://www.opini 
ojuris.org/posts/1168811565.shtml. The U.S. government’s position on obtaining custody 
over detainees appears to have evolved. The U.S. government no longer asserts that it has the 
authority to use its coercive powers to capture suspects all over the world without the consent 
of the territorial state. See Bellinger Speech, supra, at 10-11. Nevertheless, the U.S. govern-
ment continues to assert the authority to detain, based on the law of armed conflict, non-
battlefield suspects who find themselves in U.S. hands.  
7 See Eckholm & Johnston, supra note 1; Mark Mazzetti, Pentagon Revises Its Rules on 
Prosecution of Terrorists, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2007, at A18. 
8    See Verbatim Transcript of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Hearing for ISN 10024, 
at 21, Mar. 10, 2007, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/transcript_ISN10024.pdf 
(transcript of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed’s hearing at Guantánamo Bay); see also Mark Maz-
zetti & Margot Williams, In Tribunal Statement, Confessed Plotter of Sept. 11 Burnishes 
Image as a Soldier, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2007, at A15. 
9 See George W. Bush, President of the U.S., President Discusses Creation of Military 
 Commissions to Try Suspected Terrorists (Sept. 6, 2006) [hereinafter President's Speech 
 on Military Commissions],  available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/09
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armed-conflict detentions, then, counterterrorism detentions are not neces-
sarily intended to punish for prior wrongdoing,10 
 
but to prevent terrorist 
operatives from planning or engaging in further attacks and, if possible, to 
obtain from them information for use in future military, intelligence, or law 
enforcement operations. Advocates of the armed-conflict approach assert 
that these goals cannot always be achieved through the criminal process.11
 
 
The second, competing strand of thought rejects the application of 
the law of armed conflict and asserts that international human rights law 
applies to prohibit the detention of non-battlefield suspects except through 
the criminal process.12 Advocates of this position point to the inadequacy of 
the controls under the law of armed conflict, to the very real possibility that 
detainees will be held for life without legal process, and to the known inci-
dents of mistake. Individuals wrongfully suspected of terrorism have been 
captured in the course of their everyday lives and then detained for extended 
periods without any judicial oversight, and often without communication 
with the outside world. In one case, a German national (named Khaled el-
Masri) was arrested by Macedonian officials, transferred to the CIA for 
detention and interrogation, and then released five months later in rural Al-
bania after U.S. officials determined that he had been mistakenly identified 
as a terrorism suspect.13
 
This and similar cases demonstrate the problem 
   
/20060906-3.html (describing the CIA detention program as “one of the most vital tools in 
our war against the terrorists”).   
 10 International and U.S. law both recognize that detention on the grounds of danger to the 
community is not always punitive. For the international law, see Subsection II.C.2. For a 
distillation of U.S. law, see U.S. v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748-49 (1987).  
11 See, e.g., GEORGE TENET, AT THE CENTER OF THE STORM: MY YEARS AT THE CIA 255 
(2007) (“I believe that none of these successes would have happened if we had to treat KSM 
[Khalid Shaikh Mohammed] like a white-collar criminal—read him his Miranda rights and 
get him a lawyer who surely would have insisted that his client shut up.”). 
12 See, e.g., Joan Fitzpatrick, Sovereignty, Territoriality and the Rule of Law, 25 HASTINGS 
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 303, 303-04 (2002) (asserting that the United States has pursued “a 
highly problematic armed conflict alternative to the criminal law paradigm, which is readily 
available to combat terrorist acts and threats”); Avril McDonald, Terrorism, Counter-
Terrorism, and the Jus in Bello, in TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: CHALLENGES AND 
RESPONSES 57, 62 (Michael N. Schmitt & Gian Luca Beruto eds., 2002) (“Al Qaeda and 
other terrorist organizations must be defeated for the most part by detection (good intelli-
gence) and by prosecution . . . under domestic criminal legislation.”); David Weissbrodt & 
Amy Bergquist, Extraordinary Rendition: A Human Rights Analysis, 19 HARV. HUM. RTS J. 
123, 136 (2006) (arguing that the detention of non-battlefield terrorism suspects not formally 
convicted of a crime violates human rights law); Michael Ratner, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 15, 2007, at A12 (“No domestic or international law permits preventative deten-
tion [in the fight against terrorism].”).  
 13 See Council of Eur., Comm. on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Alleged Secret Deten-
tions and Unlawful Inter-State Transfers of Detainees Involving Council of Europe Member 
States, at 25-29, EUR. PARL. DOC. 10957 (June 12, 2006) (prepared by Dick Marty) [herei-
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with applying the law of armed conflict without sufficient checks and in the 
absence of any geographic or temporal constraints: it comes to displace hu-
man rights law, such that anyone who is merely suspected of terrorism may 
be picked up anywhere in the world and detained indefinitely, without judi-
cial guarantees.14
 
The criminal process, by contrast, is a fair and transparent 
mechanism for determining that those who are suspected of terrorism are in 
fact dangerous, based on their prior conduct.  
This debate is important, but it has become both sterile and di-
vorced from reality. In fact, neither strand of thought tracks international 
law and practice. International human rights law recognizes that, even in 
peacetime, those who threaten state security may be detained outside the 
criminal process and instead through calibrated systems of administrative 
detention. The option of administrative detention, however, has been neg-
lected in the international legal debate on non-battlefield detentions.15
 
This 
has been to our detriment. International practice demonstrates that states—
and particularly western democracies that take seriously their human rights 
obligations, but also face a real threat from transnational jihadi terrorism—
perceive an occasional but serious need to detain non-battlefield terrorism 
suspects outside the criminal process. In the absence of a clear legal frame-
work for satisfying that need, these states have resorted to a variety of ad 
hoc or uncontrolled measures. Thus, although all western democracies con-
tinue to rely heavily on the criminal process to prosecute and detain non-
battlefield suspects,16 many have also acted outside that process. The bipolar 
   
nafter COE Report]; Neil A. Lewis, Man Mistakenly Abducted by CIA Seeks Reinstatement 
of Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2006, at A15. 
14 Cf. Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, War Everywhere: Rights, National Security Law, and the 
Law of Armed Conflict in the Age of Terror, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 675 (2004) (describing the 
blurring of boundaries between war and peace in the fight against terrorism); Steven Ratner, 
Are the Geneva Conventions Out of Date?, 48 L. QUADRANGLE NOTES 66, 70 (2005) (“The 
conflict with Al Qaeda needs to have boundaries beyond which the . . . law of war . . . do[es] 
not apply.”). 
 15 Although neglected in the international legal debate, U.S. lawyers have begun advocat-
ing for the United States to detain terrorism suspects administratively. See, e.g., Benjamin 
Wittes, Terrorism, the Military, and the Courts, 143 POL'Y REV. 21 (2007); Jack Goldsmith 
& Neal Katyal, Op-Ed., The Terrorists’ Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2007, at A19; Michael 
Mukasey, Editorial, Jose Padilla Makes Bad Law, WALL. ST. J., Aug. 22, 2007, at A15; 
Stuart Taylor, Terrorism Suspects and the Law, NAT'L J., May 12, 2007, at 17; George J. 
Terwilliger, III, “Domestic Unlawful Combatants”: A Proposal to Adjudicate Constitutional 
Detentions, ENGAGE, Oct. 2006, at 55. 
 16 For a sample of cases in which the United States has criminally prosecuted non-
battlefield suspects, see United States v. Siraj, 468 F. Supp. 2d 408, 413-14 (E.D.N.Y. 2007), 
concerning a conspiracy to bomb a New York City subway station; United States v. Ali, 396 
F. Supp. 2d 703 (E.D.N.Y. 2005), concerning membership in al Qaeda and participation in a 
plan to carry out terrorist attacks in the United States); and Ralph Blumenthal, American Said 
to Have Ties to Al Qaeda Is Denied Bail, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2007, at A20, reporting that at 
least fifteen Americans have been charged with aiding al Qaeda. For examples in other west-
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paradigm for thinking about non-battlefield detentions—as armed-conflict 
or criminal—fails to reflect international law and is increasingly out of step 
with international practice.  
This Article takes that international practice seriously in order to 
move the conversation beyond the stale armed-conflict or criminal divide. 
Part II reviews the current debate and argues that international law actually 
presents us with three—not two—broad models for detention in the fight 
against terrorism: the armed-conflict model and, under human rights law, 
the criminal and administrative models. Part II demonstrates that interna-
tional law is ambiguous as to which of these three models properly governs 
non-battlefield detentions, but that both the armed-conflict model and ex-
clusive reliance on the criminal model carry significant costs. Administra-
tive detention thus is a potentially appealing alternative for incapacitating 
non-battlefield suspects before they strike.  
Part III, however, argues that the legal parameters of administrative 
detention are poorly developed or unworkable in the security context. This 
renders administrative detention insufficiently constrained and easily sub-
ject to abuse. Indeed, several states have resorted to administrative detention 
in the fight against terrorism and have failed to administer adequate con-
trols. States have also engaged in other, even less palatable measures. The 
United States consistently has asserted the authority to detain non-battlefield 
suspects based on the law of armed conflict, and even though most other 
states publicly reject that practice, several have discreetly participated in 
it.17
  
Several have also sought to deport terrorism suspects, despite the risk 
of mistreatment in their home countries, in order to reduce the more prox-
imate threat these suspects pose in the deporting states’ own territories.18
 
Part IV reviews that practice to demonstrate that states perceive a real need 
to contain the threat from non-battlefield suspects without resort to the crim-
inal process, and that they have employed a range of ad hoc or uncontrolled 
measures to satisfy that need.   
In light of that practice, Part V argues that international law should 
continue to allow states to detain non-battlefield suspects outside the crimi-
nal process, but that it must better regulate such detention to protect against 
abuse. The oft-overlooked administrative model is best suited to accomplish 
   
ern democracies, see Colin Warbrick, The European Response to Terrorism in an Age of 
Human Rights, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 989 (2004) (Europe); Alan Cowell, British Antiterrorism 
Chief Warns of More Severe Qaeda Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2007, at A5 (United King-
dom); Renwick McLean, Trial Opens in Madrid for 24 Accused of Aiding Qaeda Cell, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 23, 2005, at A10 (Spain); Elaine Sciolino & Helene Fouquet, Belgium Is Trying 
to Unravel the Threads of a Terror Web, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2005, at A1 (Belgium); and 
Craig S. Smith, 6 Former Guantánamo Detainees on Trial in Paris, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 
2006, at A8 (France).  
17 See infra Sections III.A, III.B. 
18 See infra Section III.B. 
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these goals, if the law on administrative detention is developed to better 
balance the liberty and security interests as they arise in the fight against 
terrorism. Toward that end, Part V outlines four policy goals to inform the 
development of law in this area. First, detainees must be afforded prompt 
and meaningful legal process. Second, extended administrative detention 
should be permitted only in narrowly defined circumstances: where the de-
tainee himself poses a serious security threat, where detention is necessary 
to contain that threat, and where detention lasts no longer than necessary. 
Third, in those circumstances, security-based administrative detention 
should be permitted even if not tied to other legal proceedings, such as fu-
ture criminal charges or deportation. And finally, any state that employs a 
system of administrative detention must define the boundaries between it 
and the criminal process. With these constraints in place, administrative 
detention may prove an effective way to navigate between the at times op-
posing shoals of liberty and security that make the legal response to non-
battlefield detention at once so vexing and so vital.  
Before proceeding with that argument, three clarifying points are in 
order. First, it is important to establish at the outset the parameters of each 
of the three models for detention examined in this Article. The armed-
conflict model broadly permits detention, without judicial guarantees, until 
the circumstances justifying it cease to exist. As this Article explains in Sec-
tion II.B, the law of armed conflict is, in fact, more nuanced. It recognizes 
different detention regimes, depending on whether the conflict is interna-
tional or non-international, and if the former, whether the detainee is a com-
batant or a civilian. Nevertheless, the broad strokes of the armed-conflict 
model (as just described) are constant across the various detention re-
gimes.19 The criminal model, by contrast, is more restrictive. It permits de-
tention in essentially two circumstances: (1) where the person has been 
charged with a criminal offense and is awaiting a criminal adjudication; and 
(2) where the person is being punished after a criminal conviction. This 
Article acknowledges that other forms of detention may also be used to ad-
vance the interests of the criminal process—for instance, to prevent flight 
before filing criminal charges, or to preserve a material witness for use dur-
ing a criminal trial.20
 
Yet it does not understand those forms of detention to 
be “through” the criminal process or under the criminal model. To the con-
trary, such detention is understood to be administrative. Generally speaking, 
  
 19 Note that detentions based on the armed-conflict model may nevertheless be inconsis-
tent with particular aspects of the law of armed conflict. The purpose of this Article is not to 
condemn such inconsistencies, but rather to examine the antecedent question of whether the 
armed-conflict model is even a suitable one for non-battlefield detentions. 
20 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2000) (U.S. material witness statute); United States v. 
Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2003) (interpreting the material witness statute to permit the 
detention of witnesses for criminal proceedings relating to the September 11 attacks). 
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the administrative model encompasses detentions designed to satisfy strong 
public interests other than punishment or condemnation for proscribed, prior 
conduct.    
Second, this Article addresses the legal standards that govern deten-
tion itself, and not the conditions of confinement or the treatment of detai-
nees. Those latter issues have been addressed comprehensively in the legal 
literature,21 
 
and this Article assumes that, under all models of detention, 
controls may be established (consistent with the applicable legal prescrip-
tions) to protect detainees against mistreatment.  
Finally, this Article focuses on the detention options available to 
states that are targeted by transnational jihadi groups like al Qaeda.22
 
That 
focus is appropriate because, as explained in Part II, the fight against such 
groups has attributes of an armed conflict that justify the use of detention 
options outside the criminal process, but also attributes that make it unlike 
other armed conflicts, and that render inadequate the detention options un-
der the law of armed conflict. Despite the particular focus on transnational 
jihadi groups, however, this Article has obvious implications for states seek-
ing to detain members of other kinds of terrorist or insurgent groups. 
Whether security-based administrative detention is justifiable in those other 
contexts ultimately depends on the nature of the fight and the security threat 
posed. In order for such detention to be viable, however, its parameters must 
be refined.  
II. A TRIPOLAR PARADIGM  
International lawyers have vigorously debated which legal re-
gime—the law of armed conflict or human rights law—governs measures 
taken in the fight against terrorism. The focal point of debate has been 
whether terrorist acts and the varied counterterrorism measures taken in 
response may properly be characterized as an “armed conflict” so as to trig-
ger the application of the law of armed conflict. If we are engaged in a 
global armed conflict against transnational jihadi groups, then (the reason-
ing goes) the law of armed conflict governs all or most measures that target 
  
 21 See, e.g., David E. Graham, The Treatment and Interrogation of Prisoners of War and 
Detainees, 37 GEO. J. INT'L L. 61 (2005); Jordan J. Paust, Executive Plans and Authorizations
to Violate International Law Concerning Treatment and Interrogation of Detainees, 43 
COLUM J. TRANSNAT'L L. 811 (2005); Jack Balkin, The Anti-Torture Memos, BALKINIZATION, 
Dec. 22, 2006, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2006/12/anti-torture-memos.html (compilation of  
posts on civil liberties in the so-called “War on Terror”). 
 22 For a coded map of countries recently attacked by such groups, see World Under Fire, 
Radical Islamic Incidents Across the World, http://www.worldunderfire.com (last visited 
March 31, 2008). 
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such groups, including the detention of non-battlefield terrorism suspects.23
 
By contrast, if we are not engaged in a global armed conflict, then the law 
of armed conflict applies only in those regions where hostilities remain on-
going, and human rights law applies without specification everywhere else 
(i.e., to all detentions taken outside a theater of combat).24
 
The predominant 
assumption is that, where human rights law applies, it permits detention 
only through the criminal process.25 
This Part of the Article argues that international law is indetermi-
nate on the question of whether the fight against terrorism constitutes an 
armed conflict, and that the focus on that question has obscured more fun-
damental questions concerning the suitability of the existing legal regimes 
to govern particular counterterrorism measures.26
 
In the context of non-
  
 23 For general arguments that the law of armed conflict governs, see, for example, OREN 
GROSS & FIONNUALA NÍ AOLÁIN, LAW IN TIMES OF CRISIS: EMERGENCY POWERS IN THEORY 
AND PRACTICE 389-93 (2006); and Derek Jinks, The Applicability of the Geneva Conventions 
to the “Global War on Terrorism,” 46 VA. J. INT'L L. 165, 169 (2005), concluding that the 
law of armed conflict governs “some aspects of the GWOT.” For arguments that the law of 
armed conflict governs the detention of non-battlefield terrorism suspects, see sources cited 
supra note 6. 
 24 For general arguments that the law of armed conflict does not govern, see, for example, 
Mary Ellen O’Connell, The Legal Case Against the Global War on Terror, 36 CASE. W. RES. 
J. INT'L L. 349, 350 (2004); and Jordan J. Paust, Antiterrorism Military Commissions: Court-
ing Illegality, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 8 n.16 (2001).   
 25 See sources cited supra note 12. For evidence that this bipolar paradigm exists, see, for 
example, Sean O. Murphy, Evolving Geneva Convention Paradigms in the “War on Terror-
ism”: Applying the Core Rules to the Release of Persons Deemed “Unprivileged Comba-
tants,” 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1105, 1151, which states that “if al Qaeda suspects picked up 
in places other than the battlefield . . . are not regarded as combatants under the laws of war, 
then they . . . could be arrested and tried in regular courts for transnational crime, or they 
could be closely monitored by law enforcement authorities”; and Int’l Comm. of the Red 
Cross, US Detention Related to the Events of 11 September 2001 and Its Aftermath—the 
Role of the ICRC, (Sept. 5, 2006), http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwpList74/85C 
5BCF85E7A57A4C12570D5002E6889, stating that, “There are currently two broad strands 
of legal thinking: according to one, detainees in the ‘global war on terror’ are all criminal 
suspects and should be treated as such. According to the other, they are all prisoners of war 
and should be treated as such.”  
 26 Some scholars have argued that the existing legal regimes are insufficient in the fight 
against terrorism and that the international community must therefore develop new rules to 
govern that fight. See, e.g., Rosa Brooks, Protecting Rights in the Age of Terrorism: Chal-
lenges and Opportunities, 36 GEO. J. INT'L L. 669, 677-78 (2005); Glenn M. Sulmasy, The 
Law of Armed Conflict in the Global War on Terror: International Lawyers Fighting the 
Last War, 19 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 309, 314 (2005). But see Gabor Rona, 
Legal Frameworks to Combat Terrorism: An Abundant Inventory of Existing Tools, 5 CHI. J. 
INT'L L. 499, 499 (2005) (“[W]e should be skeptical of the view that the complementary 
frameworks of criminal law, human rights law, the web of multilateral and bilateral arrange-
ments for interstate cooperation in police work and judicial assistance, and the law of armed 
conflict fail to provide tools necessary to combat terrorism.”). These scholars, however, have 
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battlefield detentions, international law offers three—not two—broad mod-
els for detention: the armed-conflict model, and under human rights law, the 
criminal and administrative models. Neither the armed-conflict model nor 
the criminal model is particularly well-suited for such detentions, so admin-
istrative detention is a potentially appealing alternative. Its appeal, however, 
depends largely on how it is implemented—a question to which this Article 
turns in Part III. 
A.          Armed Conflict?   
International law provides no clear guidance on when, in the ab-
sence of sustained interstate hostilities, an “armed conflict” exists so as to 
trigger the application of the law of armed conflict.27  Under international 
law, the existence of an armed conflict turns on a qualitative assessment of: 
(1) the participants’ own understandings and intentions; (2) their level of 
organization; and (3) the intensity and duration of the violence.28
 
This test is 
indeterminate in the fight against terrorism.   
That fight certainly has some attributes of an armed conflict. Partic-
ipants have been engaged in “hot” zones of combat for over six years, and at 
least two participants—al Qaeda and the United States—understand them-
selves to be at war with each other.29
 
In addition, terrorist attacks have the 
   
not addressed the particular context of non-battlefield detentions and have not attempted to 
specify the rules that should govern in this area. 
27 See LINDSAY MOIR, THE LAW OF INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT, 31-34 (2002).  
28 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadi, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on the Defence Motion for 
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Oct. 2, 1995) (asserting that an “armed conflict 
exists whenever there is . . . protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and 
organized armed groups”); MICHAEL BOTHE, KARL JOSEF PARTSCH & WALDEMAR A. SOLF, 
NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: COMMENTARY ON THE TWO 1977 PROTOCOLS 
ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949, at 628 n.9 (1982) (quoting ICRC under-
standings that armed conflicts do not include riots “not directed by a leader and hav[ing] no 
concerted intent,” but do include “military operations carried out by armed forces or orga-
nized armed groups”); THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL STRIFE: THEIR 
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 76 (1987) (explaining that armed conflicts are distinguished 
from mere internal tensions and disturbances based on the level of organization of the actors, 
their intent, and the duration and intensity of the conflict). 
29 See, e.g., Bin Laden Still Alive, Aide Says, WASH. POST, Dec. 7, 2005, at A20 (reporting 
on an al Qaeda statement that it is still engaged in a war against the West); Selig S. Harrison, 
A New Hub for Terrorism? In Bangladesh, an Islamic Movement with Al-Qaeda Ties Is on 
the Rise, WASH. POST, Aug. 2, 2006, at A15 (referring to Osama Bin Laden’s first declaration 
of war against the United States, made on February 23, 1998); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of 
Def., DOD Responds to ABA Enemy Combatant Report (Oct. 2, 2002), available at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/Releases/ Release.aspx?ReleaseID=3492 (asserting that “the 
United States is currently in a state of war with al Qaeda”); cf. STEPHEN C. NEFF, WAR AND 
THE LAW OF NATIONS: A GENERAL HISTORY 388 (2005) (quoting a high-level British official 
as asserting that Britain is “at war with terrorism”). 
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potential for extraordinary violence, especially if they involve the use of 
chemical, nuclear, or biological weapons.30
 
These attacks thus may chal-
lenge national sovereignty and inflict human casualties in ways that are pa-
radigmatic of wartime battles.31
 
 
Yet the fight against terrorism also has attributes that indicate that it 
is not an armed conflict. For instance, although terrorist attacks have the 
potential for extreme violence, the violence to date has been somewhat epi-
sodic. In the ten-year period since al Qaeda first declared war, it and its af-
filiates have committed only a handful of attacks against the United States 
outside recognizable theaters of combat. The attacks against U.S. allies have 
been similarly intermittent. Moreover, even though these groups have some 
organizational structure—in that their leaderships are identifiable and pro-
vide operational, financial, or ideological support for adherents—their le-
vels of organization do not compare to that of a state’s armed forces or an 
armed insurgency. Group “members” are geographically dispersed; they act 
in independent and compartmentalized units, rather than as a coordinated 
whole; their immediate agendas vary; and many have only loose (or no) 
connections to an organizational base.32 
 
The “parties” to the conflict thus 
cannot be identified except in broad and abstract terms.33
 
Unfortunately, this indeterminacy on whether the global fight 
against terrorism constitutes an armed conflict cannot be resolved by refer-
ence to the current law of armed conflict. The 1949 Geneva Conventions 
and their Additional Protocols identify essentially two categories of armed 
  
30 Cf. OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT'L INTELLIGENCE & NAT'L INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, 
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE: THE TERRORIST THREAT TO THE U.S. HOMELAND 6 
(2007) (“We assess that al-Qa’ida will continue to try to acquire and employ chemical, bio-
logical, radiological, or nuclear material in attacks and would not hesitate to use them if it 
develops what it deems is sufficient capability.”). 
31 See Bruce Ackerman, Essay, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L. J. 1029, 1037 
(2004).  
 32 See, e.g., Combating Al Qaeda and the Militant Jihadist Threat: Hearing Before the 
Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcomm. of the H. Armed Servs. 
Comm., 109th Cong. 3 (2006) (statement of Dr. Bruce Hoffman, Chair in Counterterrorism 
and Counterinsurgency, RAND) (describing al Qaeda as having a core leadership but as 
being a “loosely organized and connected movement that mixes and matches organizational 
and operational styles”); Wyn Rees, European and Asian Responses to the US-Led “War on 
Terror,” 20 CAMBRIDGE REV. INT'L AFF. 215, 216 (2007) (describing the loosely networked 
nature of jihadi terrorist groups); Roula Khalaf & Stephen Fidler, From Frontline Attack to 
Terror by Franchise, FIN. TIMES (U.K.), July 5, 2007, at 8 (“[A]n al-Qaeda core . . . pro-
vid[es] logistic support and training to some; and offer[s] nothing more than inspiration to 
others.”). 
33 See Gabor Rona, Interesting Times for International Humanitarian Law: Challenges 
from the “War on Terror,” 27 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 55, 60 (2003) (“The concept of a 
‘party’ suggests a minimum level of organization required to enable the entity to carry out 
the obligations of law. There can be no assessment of rights and responsibilities under huma-
nitarian law in a war without identifiable parties.”). 
604 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 40:593 
conflict.34
 
The first category—international armed conflicts—includes con-
flicts between states, and under Additional Protocol I, conflicts “in which 
peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and 
against racist régimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination . . . 
in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.” 35
 
The fight against 
terrorism is neither. It is not predominantly between states and is not a fight 
for self-determination within the terms of Additional Protocol I.36  
The second category—conflicts “not of an international charac-
ter”—is undefined and arguably could be interpreted to cover the fight 
against terrorism.37
 
But doing so requires a significant conceptual leap (cha-
racterizing as “non-international” a conflict that is fought across the globe) 
and results in the application of a legal regime that was developed with an 
entirely different kind of conflict in mind.38
 
The regime applicable to non-
  
 34 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 603 
[hereinafter Additional Protocol I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Con-
flicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 610 [hereinafter Additional Protocol II]; Geneva Conven-
tion for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the 
Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva Convention I]; 
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Ship-
wrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 
[hereinafter Geneva Convention II]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prison-
ers of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention 
III]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV] [Geneva 
Conventions I-IV hereinafter referred to collectively as Geneva Conventions].   
 35 Additional Protocol I, supra note 34, art. 1, ¶ 4; see also Geneva Conventions, supra 
note 34, art. 2. 
36 See Murphy, supra note 25, at 1118. Even if the fight against terrorism could be charac-
terized as a fight for self-determination under Additional Protocol I, al Qaeda and its affili-
ates have not made the requisite unilateral declaration seeking status and assuming rights and 
obligations under Article 96 of that Protocol. Id. It thus would not apply by its terms. 
 37 Geneva Conventions, supra note 34, art. 3. For arguments that the fight against terror-
ism is a non-international armed conflict, see, for example, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 
2749, 2795 (2006); Anthony Dworkin, Military Necessity and Due Process: The Place of 
Human Rights in the War on Terror, in NEW WARS, NEW LAWS? APPLYING THE LAWS OF 
WAR IN 21ST CENTURY CONFLICTS 53 (David Wippman & Matthew Evangelista eds., 2005); 
and Derek Jinks, September 11 and the Laws of War, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (2003). 
 38 The regime applicable in non-international armed conflicts is set forth in Article 3 
(common to all four Geneva Conventions) and expanded on in Additional Protocol II. Gene-
va Conventions, supra note 34, art. 3; Additional Protocol II, supra note 34. Although the 
drafters of Common Article 3 had an internal armed conflict in mind, the text of that Article 
permits an interpretation that applies to conflicts between states, on the one hand, and armed 
sub-state actors not falling within the terms of Additional Protocol I, on the other hand. This 
appears to be the approach adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 
2795. 
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international armed conflicts was developed to temper the extraordinary 
brutality of intrastate conflicts, which, at the time, were not amenable to 
extensive international regulation. 39
 
These conflicts were relentlessly vio-
lent and geographically concentrated, not episodically violent and geograph-
ically diffuse like the fight against terrorism.  
In short, the armed-conflict classification is an inadequate trigger 
for identifying whether the law of armed conflict does or should apply in the 
fight against terrorism. That fight has only some of the attributes of an 
armed conflict. And even if it might reasonably be classified as a non-
international armed conflict, that classification does not by itself justify the 
application of a legal regime designed to govern completely different kinds 
of conflicts. That classification also fails to resolve the question of what the 
law requires. As this Article explains in the next Section, there is some am-
biguity on whether, and if so how, the law of armed conflict and human 
rights law apply concurrently during non-international armed conflicts.40
The better approach, therefore, is not to ask whether the fight against terror-
ism constitutes an armed conflict and then to mechanically apply or reject 
the law of armed conflict based on that classification, but to ask whether, 
among the available legal regimes, the law of armed conflict best balances 
the international community’s interests in the context of particular counter-
terrorism measures. In the context of non-battlefield detentions, the balance 
is between preventing terrorist attacks on the one hand, and respecting the 
liberty interests of potential detainees on the other hand.  
B.  Detention Under the Law of Armed Conflict  
There are obvious reasons why states would want to invoke the law 
of armed conflict to detain terrorism suspects. That law grants states expan-
sive detention authority on the understanding that the associated liberty 
costs must be tolerated during wartime in the interests of state security. De-
tention in this context is not about punishment; it is about incapacitating 
  
39 See, e.g., INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY: IV GENEVA CONVENTION 
RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 27-34 (Jean S. Pictet 
ed., 1958) [hereinafter COMMENTARY: IV GENEVA CONVENTION] (describing the history of 
Common Article 3); id. at 36 (asserting that Common Article 3 conflicts “take place within 
the confines of a single country”); see also INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY 
ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 
AUGUST 1949, at 1319 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987) [hereinafter COMMENTARY ON 
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS] (“[A] non-international armed conflict is distinct from an interna-
tional armed conflict because . . . the parties to the conflict are not sovereign states, but the 
government of a single state in conflict with one or more armed factions within its territo-
ry.”). 
40 See infra notes 47-49 and accompanying text. 
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persons and thereby containing the security threat they pose.41
 
This is con-
ceptually consistent with the goals of detention in the fight against terror-
ism. States looking to detain non-battlefield terrorism suspects are primarily 
interested, not in punishing them (although states may believe that punish-
ment is desirable), but in preventing them from committing future attacks, 
and if possible, obtaining from them actionable intelligence. Yet detaining 
such suspects under the law of armed conflict imposes substantially higher 
liberty costs than would be tolerated in a more conventional armed conflict.   
The fight against terrorism is not, technically, an international 
armed conflict.42 
 
If it nevertheless is treated as one for purposes of applying 
a detention regime, the law would permit states to detain anyone reasonably 
suspected of posing a security threat until the circumstances justifying de-
tention cease to exist, or until the end of hostilities.43 This regime was de-
signed for conflicts between states that would end after several years and in 
which combatants could be clearly identified.44
 
The fight against terrorism is 
not so geographically or temporally contained. It takes place across the 
globe and likely will continue for decades without any clear indicia of victo-
ry or defeat. Applying the law of armed conflict in this context would mean 
that states could detain, potentially for life, persons captured anywhere in 




Moreover, such detention need not be accompanied by meaningful 
legal process, in that detainees need not be afforded the opportunity to con-
test before a judicial body the circumstances giving rise to detention.46  In 
  
 41 In the parlance of the Geneva Conventions, the term “detention” has penal connotations. 
The Conventions use the term “internment” to refer to non-penal deprivations of liberty. See, 
e.g., Horst Fischer, Protection of Prisoners of War, in THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN 
LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS 321, 326 (Dieter Fleck ed., 1995).
42 See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text. 
43 See Geneva Convention III, supra note 34, arts. 21, 118 (permitting detention of comba-
tants in an international armed conflict until the cessation of hostilities); Geneva Convention 
IV, supra note 34, art. 42 (same for protected civilians so long as “absolutely necessary”); 
COMMENTARY: IV GENEVA CONVENTION, supra note 39, at 257 (explaining that states have 
broad discretion to define the scope of activity that renders civilian detentions necessary). 
44 See Geneva Conventions, supra note 34, art. 2; Geneva Convention III, supra note 34, 
art. 4; W. MICHAEL REISMAN & JAMES E. BAKER, REGULATING COVERT ACTION 41 (1992). 
 45 Even under the most protective regime for armed-conflict detentions—the regime go-
verning the detention of protected civilians in enemy territory—a state has broad discretion 
to detain where it has “good reason to think” the suspect poses a real security threat (for 
instance, that he is engaged in sabotage or is a member of an organization whose object is to 
cause disturbances). See COMMENTARY: IV GENEVA CONVENTION, supra note 39, at 258. 
46 See Geneva Convention III, supra note 34, arts. 21, 118 (presuming that combatants 
may be detained without legal process until the end of hostilities); Geneva Convention IV, 
supra note 34, art. 43 (permitting the detention of civilians with minimal legal process); INT'L 
COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY: III GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE 
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conventional wars, the availability of such process is less critical because 
the risk of detaining innocents is less pronounced. The Geneva Conventions 
contemplate that the majority of detainees will be combatants who identify 
themselves as such and who therefore have no basis for contesting their 
detention. Terrorists, by contrast, operate by blending into the general popu-
lation. This creates a substantial risk that any counterterrorism detention 
regime will capture a disproportionately high number of innocents. Unlike 
in international armed conflicts, then, there is a heightened need in the fight 
against terrorism for some mechanism to ensure that detention in each case 
is objectively necessary, or that the detainees are in fact dangerous.   
If the fight against terrorism is instead treated as a non-international 
armed conflict, then the rules governing detention are more ambiguous. The 
law of armed conflict does not itself establish a scheme for detention in such 
conflicts. The applicable provisions of the Geneva Conventions—set forth 
at Common Article 3—assume that a state has broad discretion to detain,47 
but (unlike the provisions governing detention in international armed con-
flicts) they do not purport to occupy the field in this area. The rules for de-
tention historically have been found in the state’s domestic law, 48 as margi-
nally constrained by the baseline protections of customary international law. 
The customary law of armed conflict recognizes that states have broad dis-
cretion to detain persons until “the circumstances justifying . . . detention . . 
. have ceased to exist.”49
 
This rule is akin to the one applicable in interna-
tional armed conflicts, and the problems with applying it to the fight against 
terrorism are the same: extended detention is permitted based only on the 
reasonable suspicion of a threat and without any judicial guarantees. 
Yet the dominant modern position is that the authority to detain dur-
ing non-international armed conflicts is further constrained by the concur-
rent application of human rights law.50
 
If one accepts that position, and the 
   
TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 546-47 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1960) [hereinafter 
COMMENTARY: III GENEVA CONVENTION]; COMMENTARY: IV GENEVA CONVENTION, supra
note 39, at 260-61 (describing that process as an independent but rudimentary second-stage 
review of whether detention is necessary for state security). 
 47 Geneva Conventions, supra note 34, art. 3. 
48 See COMMENTARY: III GENEVA CONVENTION, supra note 46, at 39-40 (explaining that 
Common Article 3 requires that persons be treated humanely but does not restrict the meas-
ures that a state may take to contain a security threat). 
 49 Additional Protocol I, supra note 34, art. 75. For evidence that Common Article 3 and 
Article 75 of Additional Protocol I reflect customary international law applicable in all 
armed conflicts, see 1 JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 299-383 (2005); and Michael J. Matheson, Continuity
and Change in the Law of War: 1975 to 2005: Detainees and POWs, 38 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. 
REV. 543, 547 (2006). 
 50 Additional Protocol II, drafted in the 1970s to enhance the minimalist provisions of 
Common Article 3, clearly contemplates the continued application of human rights law dur-
ing non-international armed conflicts. See Additional Protocol II, supra note 34, pmbl. (“Re-
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state has not derogated from its human rights obligations on detention,51 
then the law permits both administrative detention and detention through the 
criminal process. This technically is detention under human rights law (not 
under the law of armed conflict) and is examined in Section II.C below. The 
point here is that, in non-international armed conflicts governed by human 
rights law, states have the discretion to detain persons who pose a security 
threat either through a system of administrative detention or through the 
criminal process.52 
 
States have that discretion, even though detainees in 
   
calling furthermore that international instruments relating to human rights offer a basic pro-
tection to the human person . . . .”); BOTHE, PARTSCH & SOLF, supra note 28, at 636 
(“[P]rovisions of the [International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights] which have not 
been reproduced in the Protocol or which provide for a higher standard of protection than the 
Protocol should be regarded as applicable . . . .”). For other evidence that human rights law 
continues to apply during non-international armed conflicts, see, for example, BOTHE, 
PARTSCH & SOLF, supra note 28, at 619, stating that “it cannot be denied that the general 
rules contained in international instruments relating to human rights apply to non-
international conflicts”; and COMMENTARY ON ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 39, at 
1340, which notes that “Human rights continue to apply concurrently in time of armed con-
flict.” See also Karima Bennoune, Toward a Human Rights Approach to Armed Conflict: 
Iraq 2003, 11 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 171, 226-27 (2004); Theodor Meron, The Hu-
manization of Humanitarian Law, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 239, 266-73 (2000). Note that many 
international lawyers also understand human rights law to apply during international armed 
conflicts. See, e.g., Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 
1996 I.C.J. 225, ¶ 25 (July 8). Yet the application of human rights law during an international 
armed conflict would not alter the governing detention regimes because the elaborate re-
gimes of the Geneva Conventions would continue to govern as the lex specialis. 
 51 Most human rights instruments permit states to derogate from certain human rights 
obligations, including the obligations relating to detention, during declared national emer-
gencies. See Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights art. 
27, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter American Conven-
tion]; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, art. 4, U.N. 
GAOR, 21st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200 (Dec. 16, 1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 172 (entered into 
force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR]; European Convention for the Protection of Hu-
man Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 15, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter 
ECHR]. But see Organization of African Unity, African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, June 27, 1981, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5 [hereinafter African Charter] 
(containing no explicit provision for derogation). Although the texts of these instruments 
permit derogation from the obligations relating to detention, human rights bodies have as-
serted that no derogation is permitted from the obligation not to engage in arbitrary detention 
or from the obligation to subject detention to judicial review. See, e.g., Human Rights 
Comm., General Comment 29: States of Emergency (Article 4), ¶¶ 11, 16 n.9, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (Aug. 31, 2001) [hereinafter General Comment 29]. For a discus-
sion on the law governing detention during national emergencies, see generally GROSS & NÍ 
ALOÁIN, supra note 23.  
 52 See Human Rights Council, Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, 
Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development, U.N. 
Doc A/HRC/C/17/Add. 3 (Oct. 25, 2007) (prepared by Martin Scheinin); Jelena Pejic, Pro-
cedural Principles and Safeguards for Internment/Administrative Detention in Armed Con-
flict and Other Situations of Violence, 87 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 375, 377 (2005).  
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non-international armed conflicts generally are suspected criminals (not 
privileged combatants) alleged to have committed criminal acts.53  Adminis-
trative detention remains an option because such detention may be best 
suited to prevent continued fighting, and because states engaged in such 
conflicts are not expected to devote their law enforcement and other security 
resources primarily to the process of criminal prosecution and conviction.54
 
 
C.  Detention Under Human Rights Law  
The reflexive response to the problems with detaining non-
battlefield terrorism suspects under the law of armed conflict has been to 
invoke the criminal law—i.e., to assert that the fight against terrorism is not 
an armed conflict, and that human rights law governs to permit detention 
exclusively through the criminal process.55
 
There is no question that the 
criminal process is a relatively fair and transparent mechanism for detaining 
terrorism suspects, and that in many circumstances it may also be effective, 
in that it may permit states to detain for extended periods persons who have 
committed past criminal acts and who continue to threaten state security. 
  
53 See COMMENTARY ON ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 39, at 1344. 
 54 As described in the text, the decision process for identifying the governing detention 
regime is as follows: 
 
55 See supra notes 12, 24. 
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The question, however, is whether human rights law does or should require 
states that face a serious threat from transnational jihadi terrorism to detain 
non-battlefield suspects exclusively through the criminal process. This Sec-
tion argues, contrary to the predominant assumption, that human rights law 
also permits states to detain at least some such suspects administratively, in 
order to protect the public from future attacks. Before examining the current 
law on administrative detention, however, this Section explores why states 
might legitimately seek an alternative to the criminal process for containing 
the threat that non-battlefield terrorism suspects may pose.  
1.  Criminal Detention  
The criminal process is not quite the right model for detention in the 
fight against terrorism: its focus is retrospective, rather than prospective; it 
is maladroit for transnational operation; and it often fails to accommodate 
the tools used and evidence available in terrorism cases. Because of these 
incompatibilities, states that face a real threat from transnational terrorism 
but detain exclusively through the criminal process will absorb certain costs. 
Most of these costs go to the state’s security interests, because the criminal 
process will obstruct efforts to detain suspects until after they participate in 
an attack (if ever). Yet states that rely exclusively on the criminal process 
also may undermine certain liberty interests. These states will face tremend-
ous pressure to adjust their criminal laws to make them more effective in 
terrorism cases. They therefore risk contaminating the law as it applies to 
more ordinary offenses. Moreover, reliance on the criminal process may 
enable these states to detain suspects for rather lengthy periods before trial 
and thus without any determination that detention is necessary.56
 
This Sec-
tion elaborates on the incompatibilities between the criminal process and 
non-battlefield detention in order to explain why states might reasonably 
seek alternative options for detention in the fight against terrorism.  
First, the criminal process is conceptually incongruous with the 
preventative goals of non-battlefield detention, because it is retrospective in 
focus. Condemnation and punishment are appropriate only after the suspect 
has committed a proscribed act. By contrast, detentions in the fight against 
terrorism are predominantly prospective, focused not on punishing for a 
prior act, but on preventing future ones. To be sure, most criminal justice 
systems have mechanisms for moderating that retrospective focus and using 
the law proactively. For instance, states may proscribe preparatory and sup-
porting acts or may rely more heavily on inchoate offenses, like attempts 
  
56 See generally Niki Kuckes, Civil Due Process, Criminal Due Process, 25 YALE L. & 
POL'Y REV. 1 (2006) (demonstrating that pretrial detention is permitted in the United States 
without any evidentiary showing that the detainee committed a wrongful act). 
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and conspiracy.57
 
Ordinarily, however, the retrospective nature of the crimi-
nal law continues to express itself through graded punishment schemes and 
limiting legal doctrines that constrain the scope of application of the crimi-
nal proscription—for example, by requiring that a person charged with at-
tempt be “dangerously close” to committing the crime, or that a person act 
with purpose for a conviction of criminal conspiracy. These safeguards are 
integral to the overall balance of a criminal justice system. Western demo-
cracies generally are willing to accept a certain level of criminal activity in 
exchange for the assurance that individuals will not be criminally convicted 
based on premature or indeterminate evidence.  
Yet those same safeguards weaken the proactive force of the crimi-
nal law in the fight against terrorism, where the costs of accepting that level 
of criminal activity may be substantially higher. States that rely exclusively 
on the criminal process to detain non-battlefield suspects thus face an unen-
viable choice: They may maintain the ordinary safeguards of the criminal 
process and accept that some terrorism suspects identified by law enforce-
ment or intelligence officials will not be detained until after they participate 
in an attack. Or they may adjust the criminal process in ways that under-
mine its safeguards but enable them to more effectively capture suspects 
who have not yet but still might commit an attack.58
  
States will face signifi-
cant pressure to choose the latter option, but doing so carries the potential 
cost of contaminating the criminal process. Doctrines or interpretations de-
veloped in the terrorism context—and with transnational jihadi terrorists in 




Second, the criminal process is ill-equipped for the transnational na-
ture of the fight against terrorism.60
 
The criminal process depends for its 
  
 57 Many states have strengthened their criminal laws in these ways. See GROSS & AOLÁIN, 
supra note 23, at 402-04; Kent Roach, The Criminal Law and Terrorism, in GLOBAL ANTI-
TERRORISM LAW & POLICY 129, 131-36 (Victor V. Ramraj, Michael Hor & Kent Roach eds., 
2005). 
 58 For a further discussion on the adjustments made to U.S. criminal law to facilitate ter-
rorism prosecutions, see Robert M. Chesney & Jack L. Goldsmith, Terrorism and the Con-
vergence of Criminal and Military Detention Models, 60 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) 
(manuscript at 23-32), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1055501. “[P]rosecutors have 
responded to the prevention mandate with creative interpretations of existing statutes to 
establish criminal liability . . . .” Id. at 23. 
59 See generally GROSS & AOLÁIN, supra note 23, at 238-42 (demonstrating that generally 
applicable legal rules may mutate in response to emergency related precedents and con-
cerns); Roach, supra note 57, at 139 (“One danger is that extraordinary powers may be intro-
duced and justified in the anti-terrorism context but then spread to other parts of the criminal 
law.”). 
60 Cf. Dominic D. McAlea, Post Westphalian Crime, in NEW WARS, NEW LAWS? 
APPLYING THE LAWS OF WAR IN 21ST CENTURY CONFLICTS 111, 119-20 (David Wippman & 
Matthew Evangelista eds., 2005) (discussing the transnational nature of terrorism).   
612 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 40:593 
success on effective and available law enforcement, but terrorists often take 
harbor in states that lack the capability or political will to frustrate terror-
ism-related conduct in their territories. Some host states decline even to 
investigate known terrorists.61 
 
In these sorts of political environments, the 
prospects for cooperative law enforcement are slim. The host governments 
are unwilling to exercise their own law enforcement capabilities and are 
unlikely to agree to the open exercise of law enforcement powers by a for-
eign state. In other instances, a host state may be willing to prosecute a 
known terrorist but may be encumbered by ineffective tools of law en-
forcement. For instance, Abu Baker Bashir is widely believed to have parti-
cipated in at least three major terrorist attacks and two foiled plots in South-
east Asia since December 2000.62
 
Yet Indonesia, which has twice tried Ba-




What if, then, instead of prosecuting Bashir itself, Indonesia offered 
to render him to the United States? This proposition is not entirely improba-
ble. States that inadequately employ the tools of law enforcement may oper-
ate quite effectively through intelligence channels, because they may be 
willing to do surreptitiously that which, for domestic political or legal rea-
sons, they are unwilling or unable to do publicly. Indonesia itself has ren-
dered at least two terrorism suspects to the United States, and the CIA re-
portedly sought to obtain custody of Bashir.64
 
U.S. officials, however, would 
have a difficult time prosecuting Bashir in U.S. courts. The hurdles to col-
lecting and amassing evidence in a foreign state are substantial and some-
times insurmountable. This is especially the case where the foreign state 
obstructs (for domestic political or state sovereignty reasons) any joint or 
unilateral law enforcement operation in its territory,65
 
or where the investi-
  
61 See, e.g., NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION 
REPORT 115, 121-26 (2004) (describing the failure of Afghanistan and Pakistan to pursue 
Osama bin Laden); David Blair, Al-Qa'eda Regroups in the Border Lands and Prepares for a 
New Wave of Terror, DAILY TELEGRAPH (U.K.), May 31, 2007, at 20 (reporting that Pakistan 
declined to conduct any police or military operations in its Waziristan region despite the 
common understanding that al Qaeda’s leadership had reconstituted itself there). 
62 See Paddock, supra note 3. 
63 See Shawn Donnan & Taufan Hidayat, Jailed Indonesian to Be Freed, FIN. TIMES 
(U.K.), Mar. 10, 2004, at 11 (reporting that, in the first trial, Bashir was convicted only of a 
minor immigration offense); Stephen Fitzpatrick & Natalie O’Brien, Hambali Could Have 
Kept JI Leader in Jail, WEEKEND AUSTRALIAN, Dec. 23, 2006, at 8 (reporting that, in the 
second trial, Bashir was convicted of a terrorism-related offense but that that conviction was 
overturned).  
64 See Richard C. Paddock, Bashir Guilty in Bali Blasts, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2005, at A6 
(reporting that the United States sought to detain Bashir in the CIA program); Farah Stock-
man, Cleric’s Trial Tests US Antiterror Fight, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 2, 2005, at A1.  
65 Cf. Jim Hoagland, Accountability and the Cole Attack, WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 2001, at 
B7 (“FBI investigators [into the U.S.S. Cole bombing] have been hamstrung by Yemenis.”); 
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gation concerns preparatory or supporting acts, in anticipation of a not-yet-
completed attack. Terrorism suspects who reside in states without effective 
tools of law enforcement thus will be largely beyond the reach of the crimi-
nal law, at least until after they commit an attack.   
Finally, the criminal process may require the application of domes-
tic laws or procedures that, although perhaps appropriate for more ordinary 
criminals, fail to accommodate the sorts of tools used and evidence availa-
ble in terrorism cases. Terrorism cases rely heavily on intelligence informa-
tion that states are averse to sharing in public fora, including judicial pro-
ceedings, for fear of exposing sources or methods.66 In the criminal cases 
against Bashir, Indonesian prosecutors sought to use intelligence informa-
tion or sources from the United States and Australia—two countries with a 
particularly strong interest in Bashir being detained—but, in both cases, 
those countries declined to share the evidence.67
 
The United States also re-
fused to share such evidence with German officials prosecuting an accom-
plice to the September 11 attacks. In the German case, the conviction of the 
9/11 accomplice was overturned on the ground that, although the govern-
ment had made its case, the defendant could not adequately develop his 
defense without an intelligence source that the United States refused to 
share.68  
Further, even where a state does share such information, it may be 
inadmissible in court or may fail to satisfy the heightened burdens of proof 
of a criminal trial. Intelligence operations are designed to obtain information 
as quickly and surreptitiously as possible; they are not, like law enforcement 
operations, designed to meticulously accumulate evidence in ways that can 
withstand challenges to admissibility in court.69 
 
In the United States, intel-
ligence evidence may be inadmissible if it is hearsay or was obtained with-
out a warrant. In the Netherlands, prosecutors have lost at least two major 
   
David A. Vise & Vernon Loeb, U.S. Team May Face Difficulties in Probe, WASH. POST, Oct. 
14, 2000, at A18 (describing the bulky U.S. criminal investigation in Yemen and the practic-
al difficulties of investigating there). 
66 See Christoph J.M. Safferling, Terror and Law: German Responses to 9/11, 4 J. INT'L 
CRIM. JUST. 1152, 1162 (2006). 
67 See id.; Raymond Bonner, Indonesia Brings New Case Against Cleric Tied to Terror, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2004, at A7; Raymond Bonner, Indonesians Answer Critics of Trial 
Verdict, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2003, at A17.  
 68 Craig Whitlock, Terror Suspects Beating Charges Filed in Europe, WASH. POST, May 
31, 2004, at A1. The defendant in that case, a Moroccan man named Mounir el-Motassadeq, 
was retried and convicted in January 2007 for being an accessory in the murders of the air-
plane passengers who died in the attacks, but not in the other murders of the day. See Mark 
Landler, 9/11 Associate Is Sentenced in Germany to 15 Years, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2007, at 
A10. 
69 See Ronald J. Sievert, War on Terrorism or Global Law Enforcement Operation?, 78 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 307, 327-40 (2003). 
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terrorism cases after judges ruled that evidence obtained by intelligence 
agencies was inadmissible.70
 
And in Bashir’s case, video-link evidence from 
Singapore could not be used because it did not comply with rules designed 
to prevent tampering with witnesses.71
 
 
The criminal process thus is conceptually and sometimes operation-
ally inapt to detain non-battlefield terrorism suspects before they strike. 
Some states may choose to live with these problems. After all, states that 
readily discard the safeguards of the criminal process risk detaining arbitra-
rily or without sufficient controls. Yet states that detain non-battlefield sus-
pects exclusively through this process risk contaminating their criminal jus-
tice systems and hamstringing themselves against preventing future attacks.   
2.  Administrative Detention  
Other states may decide that, for certain non-battlefield terrorism 
suspects, the criminal process strikes the wrong balance between liberty and 
security. These states already have an alternative option for detention under 
international human rights law. Human rights law permits states to detain 
persons who pose a serious security threat—just as it permits states to detain 
persons who are awaiting deportation or who endanger public safety due to 
mental illness—not only through the criminal process, but also through ca-
librated systems of administrative detention.72
 
The option of administrative 
  
70 See Whitlock, supra note 68. 
71 See Tim Lindsey & Jeremy Kingsley, Letter, Voice with a Different Message, HERALD 
SUN (Austl.), Dec. 25, 2006, at 17, available at 2006 WLNR 22459924.   
 72 Human rights actors regularly acknowledge that security-based administrative detention 
may be lawful. See, e.g., U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm. on Prevention 
of Discrimination & Prot. of Minorities, Report on the Practice of Administrative Detention, 
¶ 17, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1990/29 (July 24, 1990) (prepared by Louis Joinet) [hereinaf-
ter Joinet Report] (“[A]dministrative detention is not banned on principle under international 
rules . . . .”); Human Rights Comm’n, Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, 
¶¶ 84-85, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/3 (Dec. 15, 2003) (acknowledging that administrative 
detention may be appropriate in the counterterrorism context); Human Rights Comm., Gen-
eral Comment 8, Right to Liberty and Security of Persons (Article 9) (June 30, 1982), re-
printed in Secretariat, Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations 
Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, 8, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (July 29, 1994) 
[hereinafter General Comment 8] (acknowledging that administrative detention is sometimes 
lawful); Human Rights Comm., Communication No. 66/1980: Uruguay, ¶ 18.1, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/17/D/66/1980 (Oct. 12, 1982) [hereinafter Human Rights Comm., Schweizer v. 
Uruguay] (“[A]dministrative detention may not be objectionable in circumstances where the 
person concerned constitutes a clear and serious threat to society which cannot be contained 
in any other manner . . . .”); Helena Cook, Preventive Detention—International Standards 
and the Protection of the Individual, in PREVENTIVE DETENTION: A COMPARATIVE AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVE 1, 1 (Stanislaw Frankowski & Dinah Shelton eds., 1992) 
(“In some circumstances preventive detention may be a legitimate means of social protection 
and control.”); Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, supra note 25 (asserting that states may detain 
persons outside the armed-conflict and criminal models “for imperative reasons of security”). 
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detention, however, has been overlooked in the international legal debate on 
non-battlefield detentions. 
Human rights law establishes both procedural and substantive con-
straints on administrative detention to protect against abuse. The procedural 
constraints are designed as safeguards against mistaken, unlawful, or arbi-
trary detentions. Any detention must be grounded in law,73 meaning that 
states must prescribe in advance the permissible bases for detention and 
then follow their own laws.74 
 
Moreover, states must inform a detainee im-
mediately of the reasons for his detention,75 
 
and must afford him the oppor-
tunity for prompt judicial review.76
 
These constraints are intended to induce 
institutional checks and balances and perform critical backstopping func-
tions. The decision to detain may not be made by one person or institution, 
but must instead be based on the prior reflection and deliberation of the leg-
islature (or, in a common law system, the courts) and subject to the over-
sight of an independent and impartial judiciary. The procedural constraints, 
therefore, are critical to preventing abuse. Yet, because they ultimately may 
be satisfied by reference to a state’s own laws, they are not always suffi-
   
Although human rights actors regularly acknowledge that security-based administrative 
detention may be lawful, they have repeatedly failed to establish meaningful parameters for 
it, except to assert that it should be used only in exceptional cases. See, e.g., Joinet Report, 
supra at 4 (“[G]overnments might at the very least might be expected to use [administrative 
detentions] only in truly exceptional cases . . . .”); Human Rights Comm., Consideration of 
Reports Submitted by State Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Comments of the Hu-
man Rights Committee, ¶ 21, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.44 (Nov. 23, 1994) (recommending 
to Morocco “that measures of administrative detention and incommunicado detention be 
restricted to very limited and exceptional cases”); INT'L COMM'N OF JURISTS, ICJ 
MEMORANDUM ON INT'L LEGAL FRAMEWORK ON ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION AND COUNTER-
TERRORISM, at 11-12, 18 (Dec. 2005) [hereinafter ICJ MEMO].  
73 See African Charter, supra note 51, art. 6 (prohibiting detentions that are not prescribed 
by law); American Convention, supra note 51, art. 7(2)-(3) (same); ICCPR, supra note 51, 
art. 9(1) (same); ECHR, supra note 51, art. 5 (same).   
74 See Yoram Dinstein, The Right to Life, Physical Integrity, and Liberty, in THE 
INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 114, 130-
31 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981).  
75 See African Charter, supra note 51, art. 7(2); ICCPR, supra note 51, art. 9(2); ECHR, 
supra note 51, art. 5(2); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 702 cmt. h (1986) 
(asserting that, under customary law, a detention will be arbitrary if “not accompanied by a 
notice of charges”); see also General Comment 8, supra note 72, at 8-9 (asserting that Article 
9(2) of the ICCPR requires states to inform administrative detainees, and not just criminal 
detainees, of the reasons for detention). 
76 See African Charter, supra note 51, art. 7(1)(a); American Convention, supra note 51, 
art. 7(5); ICCPR, supra note 51, art. 9(4); ECHR, supra note 51, art. 5(4). Some international 
actors have suggested that human rights law also requires that any detainee be provided with 
access to legal counsel. See, e.g., Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations: Israel, ¶ 
13, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/78/ISR (Aug. 21, 2003) [hereinafter Human Rights Comm., Con-
cluding Observations: Israel 2003]; Louise Arbour, In Our Name and on Our Behalf, 55 
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 511, 519 (2006). 
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cient. For example, an overzealous state may satisfy the procedural con-
straints on detention by passing legislation permitting the detention of polit-
ical dissidents and then affording suspected dissidents judicial review on the 
determination that they are dissidents. If the state’s substantive law permits 
such detention, then judicial review and the other procedural safeguards will 
not protect against it.  
Human rights law addresses that concern by imposing separate, 
substantive constraints designed to restrict the circumstances under which 
detention is lawful. These substantive constraints vary based on the source 
of law. Customary and most conventional law prohibits “arbitrary” deten-
tion without specifying the circumstances that render a detention arbitrary.77 
The test of arbitrariness that has developed in international law is fact-
specific: whether a particular detention is reasonably necessary to satisfy a 
legitimate government interest.78 In the example of the overzealous state, 
the government interest—silencing or reeducating political dissidents—
would almost certainly be considered illegitimate, and the detention unlaw-
ful for arbitrariness.   
The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) takes a 
slightly different approach from the other human rights instruments. Instead 
of specifically prohibiting arbitrary detentions,79 it delineates an exhaustive 
list of the circumstances in which detention is permitted. The ECHR specif-
ically permits detention, inter alia, for noncompliance with a lawful court 
order, for immigration control, of persons “of unsound mind,” to bring a 
person before a competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion that he 
  
77 See African Charter, supra note 51, art. 6 (prohibiting detentions that are arbitrary); 
American Convention, supra note 51, art. 7(2)-(3) (same); ICCPR, supra note 51, art. 9(1) 
(same); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, art. 9, U.N. GAOR, 3d 
Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) (reflecting the customary internation-
al rule that “[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary . . . detention”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 702(e) (1990) (“A State violates [customary] international law if, 
as a matter of state policy, it practices, encourages or condones . . . prolonged arbitrary de-
tention.”).  
78 See, e.g., Human Rights Comm., Communication No. 1324/2004: Australia, ¶ 7.2, U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/88/D/1324/2004 (Nov. 13, 2006) [hereinafter Human Rights Comm., Shafiq v. 
Australia] (detention could be arbitrary if “not necessary in all the circumstances of the case 
and proportionate to the ends sought”); Human Rights Comm., Communication No. 
560/1993: Australia, ¶ 7.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/59/D/560/1993 (Apr. 3, 1997) [hereinafter 
Human Rights Comm., A. v. Australia] (same if “not necessary in all the circumstances of 
the case”); Human Rights Comm., Communication No. 305/1988: Netherlands, ¶ 5.8, U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/39/D/305/1988 (Aug. 15, 1990) (same if not “reasonable in all the circums-
tances”); see also Jordan J. Paust, Judicial Power to Determine the Status and Rights of 
Persons Detained Without Trial, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 503, 507 (2003). 
 79 The European Court of Human Rights has interpreted the ECHR to contain an implicit 
requirement of non-arbitrariness, see Winterwerp v. Netherlands, 33 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 
17-18 (1979), but that requirement may be satisfied procedurally, see infra notes 88-90 and 
accompanying text.  
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has committed a criminal offense, or when reasonably necessary, to prevent 
him from committing such an offense.80 
 
States parties to the ECHR must fit 
any administrative detention within one of these categories for which deten-
tion has been deemed justifiable.  
The human rights instruments thus outline a structure for adminis-
trative detention that, when used for reasons of national security, falls 
somewhere between armed-conflict detention and criminal detention. Like 
detention under the law of armed conflict, administrative detention is pre-
ventative. Its focus is on incapacitating persons who pose a future security 
threat, not on punishing them for past harms. Moreover, because administra-
tive detention is outside the criminal process, it need not be subject to coun-
try-specific rules of criminal law or procedure that, although perhaps appro-
priate for more ordinary criminals, may strike the wrong balance between 
liberty and security in the context of particular terrorism suspects. Yet, as 
with criminal detention, administrative detention must be objectively neces-
sary or justified and must be subject to meaningful judicial review. Given 
the inadequacies of the armed-conflict and criminal models, and given the 
nature of the fight against terrorism—in that it has some but not other 
attributes of an armed conflict— administrative detention presents a poten-
tially appealing legal framework for detaining non-battlefield terrorism sus-
pects. Its appeal, however, depends largely on how it is implemented.  
III. EXAMINING ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION  
Where administrative detention is used for reasons of national secu-
rity, it tends to be implemented in one of three ways: (1) detention prior to 
filing criminal charges; (2) detention pending deportation; and (3) “pure” 
security-based detention premised only on the interest in containing the 
security threat. At first blush, it might appear to be relatively uncomplicated 
to assess, on a case-by-case basis, the legality of such detentions by refer-
ence to the procedural and substantive constraints described above. In prac-
tice, however, the substantive constraints that international law imposes on 
detention have proven insufficient in the security context. Thus, although 
the law permits security-based administrative detention, it currently is in-
adequate to govern non-battlefield detentions in the fight against terrorism.  
This Part demonstrates the insufficiency of the existing substantive 
constraints on administrative detention by reviewing the jurisprudence of 
two prominent human rights bodies: the Human Rights Committee under 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the 
European Court of Human Rights under the ECHR.81 The Human Rights 
Committee reviews administrative detentions under a standard of non-
  
80 See ECHR, supra note 51, art. 5(1). 
81 See also sources cited supra note 72. 
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arbitrariness, which it has interpreted to mean that detention must be rea-
sonably necessary to satisfy a legitimate government interest.82
 
That test is 
meaningless in the security context. All governments have a legitimate in-
terest in protecting against serious threats to national security, and the de-
termination that a threat renders detention necessary is not easily re-
viewed.83
  
Such determinations are based on classified evidence and risk 
assessments that may not be available to review bodies and on which they 
have no expertise. The committee deals with that problem simply by neg-
lecting the standard of non-arbitrariness and emphasizing instead the 
ICCPR’s procedural constraints on detention. As a result, the standard of 
non-arbitrariness remains underdeveloped. There is, in other words, almost 
no guidance on when security-based administrative detention may be lawful 
under the ICCPR, and when it is unlawful for arbitrariness.  
The problem under the ECHR is slightly different. The substantive 
constraint under the ECHR is the requirement that any detention fall within 
one of the categories for which it is specifically permitted. Under the court’s 
jurisprudence, the ECHR permits security-based detention predicated on 
other proceedings (for example, criminal trial or deportation) irrespective of 
any showing of actual necessity, but it prohibits pure security-based deten-
tion, even if objectively necessary to contain a serious security threat. This 
framework creates an incentive for states to detain under the false pretense 
of future criminal or immigration proceedings, even where such proceed-
ings are not forthcoming. Indeed, Part IV demonstrates that a number of 
states have done just that.  
A.  Detention Predicated on Criminal or Immigration Proceedings   
The European Court of Human Rights and the Human Rights 
Committee both review leniently detentions predicated on future criminal or 
immigration proceedings. In the case of future criminal proceedings, the 
ECHR specifically permits detention “on reasonable suspicion [that a per-
son has] committed an offense.”84
 
The European Court of Human Rights has 
explained that a state may detain persons under that provision where the 
state intends to pursue criminal charges, even if it never does.85 Thus, in 
Brogan v. United Kingdom, the court found that the United Kingdom did 
not violate the ECHR’s substantive constraint when it detained terrorism 
suspects for as long as seven days without filing any criminal charges 
  
82 See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
83 Cf. GROSS & ALOÁIN, supra note 23, at 264-67 (describing the difficulty international 
bodies have in reviewing official justifications for resorting to emergency measures). 
 84 ECHR, supra note 51, § I, art. 5(1)(c). 
 85 Brogan v. United Kingdom, 145 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 16, 29 (1988). 
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against them.86
 
With respect to future immigration proceedings, the ECHR 
permits detention “with a view to deportation.”87 In Chahal v. United King-
dom, the court explained that a state may detain under that provision so long 
as deportation proceedings are diligently pursued and the decision to detain 
is not arbitrary.88 Notably, however, the court did not adopt the traditional 
international test of non-arbitrariness that requires a showing of reasonable 
necessity.89 Instead, it understood that standard in purely procedural terms. 
Even though the detainee in Chahal contested the determination that he 
posed a security threat, the court declined to review that determination on 
the ground that the domestic processes for making it were sufficiently ela-
borate to protect against arbitrariness.90 The European Court of Human 
Rights thus has upheld security-based detentions predicated on future crimi-
nal or immigration proceedings without making any independent determina-
tion that detention is necessary or justified.91
 
 
Under the ICCPR, the existence of future criminal or immigration 
proceedings does not necessarily satisfy the standard of non-arbitrariness 
because the committee interprets that standard to require that detention in 
each case be reasonably, or objectively, necessary to satisfy the government 
interest. Nevertheless, the committee declines to review necessity determi-
nations in cases involving claims of national security. By default, then, the 
committee declines to find that security-based detentions predicated on 
  
86 Id. at 16. 
 87 ECHR, supra note 51, § I, art. 5(1)(f). 
 88 App. No. 22414/93, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 413, 465-66 (1996).  
89 Id. at 464 (asserting that the ECHR “does not demand that the detention of a person 
against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation be reasonably considered 
necessary . . . . all that is required . . . is that ‘action is being taken with a view to deporta-
tion’”); id. at 466-67. 
90 Id. at 464; see also Saadi v. United Kingdon, App. No. 13229/03, 44 Eur. H.R. Rep 
1005, 1015-16 (2007) (rejecting the detainee’s claim of arbitrariness for lack of necessity in 
part because “domestic law provided a system of safeguards”). But cf. id. at 1015 (suggesting 
that the ECHR standard of non-arbitrariness may have a substantive element to it, to the 
extent it limits the permissible duration of detention). 
91 See also, e.g., Conka v. Belgium, App. No. 51564/99, 34 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1298, 1299 
(2002) (reiterating that detentions predicated on deportation proceedings need not be neces-
sary); Assenov v. Bulgaria, App. No. 24760/94, 28 Eur. H.R. Rep. 652, 656-58 (1999) (fo-
cusing on the procedures for pretrial detention without making any independent assessment 
of necessity). Note that the European Court of Human Rights engages in a somewhat more 
probing review of pretrial detention than of pre-deportation detention. See Chahal, 23 Eur. 
H.R. Rep. at 464. Nevertheless, that review does not involve an independent determination of 
necessity or justification. Instead, it consists of an examination of whether domestic bodies 
have set forth “relevant” and “sufficient” grounds for detention. See, e.g., Lind v. Russia, 
App. No. 25664/05, ¶ 71 (Dec. 6, 2007), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/sea 
rch.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search for term “Lind,” then follow the link “Case of Lind v. Rus-
sia”). 
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criminal or immigration proceedings are arbitrary. For instance, in Banda-
jevsky v. Belarus, the committee reviewed a pre-charge detention that lasted 
twenty-three days.92 Belarus asserted that the detention was necessary on 
the ground that the detainee was involved in particularly dangerous criminal 
conduct. Of course, Belarus had not yet tried the detainee, so it had not yet 
proven that he was, in fact, involved in conduct necessitating detention. The 
committee, however, declined to probe Belarus’s necessity determination or 
to otherwise give texture to the standard of non-arbitrariness. It found, simp-
ly, that the detainee had failed to make a showing of arbitrariness.93 
 
The 
committee likewise avoided that standard in Ahani v. Canada, a case in-
volving a nine-year detention pending deportation on national security 
grounds.94 
 
In that case, the committee asserted, without further discussion, 
that “detention on the basis of a security certification by two Ministers on 
national security grounds does not result ipso facto in arbitrary detention.”95





 92 Human Rights Comm., Communication No. 1100/2002: Belarus, ¶ 10.2, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/86/D/1100/2002 (Apr. 18, 2006). The author of this claim was not suspected of 
engaging in terrorist activity but was charged under a presidential decree relating to “the 
fight of terrorism and other particularly dangerous violent crimes.” Id. According to Belarus, 
he was the leader of a particularly dangerous organized criminal group. Id. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Human Rights Comm., Communication No. 1051/2002: Canada, ¶ 4.13, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/80/D/1051/2002 (June 15, 2004) (hereinafter Human Rights Comm., Ahani v. Can-
ada). 
95 Id. ¶ 10.2.  
 96 For a more thorough discussion of this decision, see Gerald Heckman, International Deci-
sions: Ahani v. Canada, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 699 (2006). Note that the Human Rights Commit-
tee engages in a significantly more probing review of immigration detention where the as-
serted justification for detention is related not to national security, but instead to general 
immigration policy. Even absent a national security claim, the committee recognizes that 
states may have a legitimate interest in detaining foreign nationals pending deportation. See,
e.g., Human Rights Comm., A. v. Australia, supra note 78, ¶ 9.3 (“[T]here is no basis for the 
author’s claim that it is per se arbitrary to detain individuals requesting asylum.”); SARAH 
JOSEPH, JENNY SCHULTZ & MELISSA CASTAN, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND 
POLITICAL RIGHTS: CASES, MATERIALS, AND COMMENTARY 312-19 (2d ed. 2005) (reviewing 
the committee’s jurisprudence acknowledging that administrative detention for immigration 
control may in some instances be lawful). Yet the committee requires states to justify such 
detention in terms of individualized assessments of necessity and with periodic reviews. See,
e.g., Human Rights Comm., Shafiq v. Australia, supra note 78, ¶ 7.2 (finding immigration 
detention arbitrary because it is based only on a general policy goal of not admitting un-
cleared immigrants and not on an individualized assessment); Human Rights Comm., Com-
munication No. 1050/2002: Australia, ¶ 7.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/87/D/1050/2002, (Aug. 9, 
2006) (same); Human Rights Comm., A. v. Australia, supra note 78, ¶ 9.3 (finding immigra-
tion detention arbitrary because there was insufficient justification for extended detention).  
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B.  Pure Security-Based Detention  
Detentions predicated on criminal or immigration proceedings 
purport to further two separate government interests: the interest in contain-
ing the security threat, and the interest in either trying and punishing or de-
porting the individual. The second government interest thus serves as a sort 
of substantive check on detention—explicitly under the ECHR and by de-
fault under the ICCPR. In cases involving pure security-based detention, 
however, no other government interest exists. The purpose of detention is 
only to contain the security threat. In these cases, the European Court of 
Human Rights and the Human Rights Committee have reached very differ-
ent results.  
The European Court of Human Rights has suggested that pure secu-
rity-based detention is unlawful under the ECHR. The ECHR permits deten-
tion “for the purpose of bringing [a person] before the competent legal au-
thority . . . when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his com-
mitting an offense.”97 
 
The court, however, has interpreted that provision to 
permit detention only if tied to criminal proceedings, and not if taken to 
incapacitate a person who otherwise poses a threat or has a general propen-
sity for crime.98
 
This jurisprudence reflects the peacetime premise of the 
ECHR,99
 
and may not be entirely appropriate in the fight against terrorism. 
But unless the ECHR is amended or reinterpreted in the context of that 
fight, states parties to it must squeeze any security-based detention into one 
of the other ECHR categories.   
By contrast, pure security-based detention is permitted under the 
ICCPR, so long as it is reasonably necessary to contain the security threat. 
The problem, again, is that the Human Rights Committee has provided al-
most no guidance on when security-based detention should be considered 
reasonably necessary. Even when reviewing the detentions by the United 
States at Guantánamo Bay—which it apparently did under the lens of ad-
ministrative detention—the committee focused only on the ICCPR’s proce-
dural constraints. It criticized the inadequacy of process at Guantánamo Bay 
and encouraged the United States to afford all Guantánamo detainees “pro-
ceedings before a court to decide, without delay, on the lawfulness of their 
  
 97   ECHR, supra note 51, art. 5(1)(c). 
98   See, e.g., Lawless v. Ireland (No. 3), 3 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), ¶¶ 13-15, 48 (1961); see 
also Ciulla v. Italy, 148 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 1, ¶ 38 (1989); Guzzardi v. Italy, 3 Eur. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. A) 333, 367-68, ¶ 102 (1980). But cf. Ericksen v. Norway (No. 37), 1997-III Eur. 
Ct. H.R. 839, ¶¶ 85-86 (1997) (finding detention after conviction and sentence justified, in 
light of the detainee’s “impaired mental state and . . . foreseeable propensity for violence,” 
because the detention was “closely linked to the original criminal proceedings”). 
99 Cf. Gerald L. Neuman, Comment, Counter-Terrorist Operations and the Rule of Law, 
15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1019, 1021 (2004) (“The text of the European Convention suggests that it 
was not designed to regulate the conduct of war.”). 
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detention or order their release.”100 
 
But it did not suggest that the requisite 
process could be afforded only under the criminal law, and it did not ad-
dress whether the Guantánamo detentions would be unlawful (as arbitrary) 
even if accompanied by adequate legal process.  
The committee’s neglect of the standard of non-arbitrariness is en-
demic to its jurisprudence on pure security-based detention. Many states 
that engage in such detention deny their practices or detain in ways that 
blatantly violate the ICCPR’s procedural constraints. In these instances, the 
committee condemns only the procedural violation or otherwise ducks the 
question of arbitrariness.101 The committee also ducks that question, howev-
er, when reviewing the practice of states that admit to administering such 
detention and that purport to do so in a manner consistent with their ICCPR 
obligations. For instance, India and Israel each ratified the ICCPR with 
statements designed to preserve the legality of pure security-based deten-
tion.102
 
In its 1996 report under the ICCPR, India acknowledged that it em-
ployed such detention in response to a “sustained campaign of terrorism” in 
its territory.103 India asserted that such detention was permitted if necessary 
to prevent a person from threatening public order or security, but India did 
not specify the circumstances in which that might be the case, and it did not 
  
100 Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: 
United States of America, ¶ 18, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/Rev.1 (Dec. 18, 2006). 
101 See, e.g., Human Rights Comm., Communication No. 1297/2004: Algeria, ¶ 8.5, U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/87/D/1297/2004 (Aug. 9, 2006) (finding the detention of a terrorist suspect 
unlawful “[i]n the absence of adequate explanations from the state party concerning the 
author’s allegations”); Human Rights Comm., Communication No. 1044/2002: Tajikistan, ¶ 
8.4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/86/D/1044/2002 (Apr. 26, 2002) (finding the detention of a bombing 
suspect unlawful based on the state’s failure to refute the claim of unlawfulness); Human 
Rights Comm., Schweizer v. Uruguay, supra note 72, ¶ 18.1 (finding that it was not “in a 
position to pronounce itself on the general compatibility of the regime of ‘prompt security 
measures’ under Uruguayan law with the Covenant”). 
102 India ratified the ICCPR with a reservation clarifying that it would interpret the ICCPR 
provisions on detentions to permit pure security-based detention taken consistent with the 
Indian Constitution. See Human Rights Comm., Reservations, Declarations, Notifications 
and Objections Relating to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 
Optional Protocols Thereto, at 25, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/2/Rev.4 (Aug. 24, 1994) [hereinafter 
ICCPR Reservations]; see also Derek Jinks, The Anatomy of an Institutionalized Emergency: 
Preventive Detention and Personal Liberty in India, 22 MICH. J. INT'L L. 311, 351-54 (2001). 
Notably, other states did not object to this reservation, even though a few did object to In-
dia’s reservation on a different ICCPR provision. See ICCPR Reservations, supra, at 53-56 
(objections of France, Germany, and the Netherlands). Israel ratified the ICCPR with a noti-
fication that it intended to exercise powers of arrest and detention as required by the exigen-
cies of its situation. Israel hedged on whether the exercise of such powers would be inconsis-
tent with the ICCPR so as to require derogation; it derogated from the detention provisions 
insofar as was necessary. Id. at 27-28. 
103 Human Rights Comm., Third Periodic Reports of States Parties Due in 1992: India, ¶ 
50, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/76/Add.6 (June 17, 2006).  
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attempt to demonstrate that it satisfied that standard.104
 
The committee nev-
ertheless was silent on the issue of arbitrariness. It expressed “regrets that 
the use of special powers of detention remains widespread” in India, and 
then accepted that India could continue to detain persons administratively 
for reasons of national security, so long as it satisfied the procedural con-
straints on detention.105  
The committee has been slightly more assertive in its observations 
on Israel. With Israel, the committee has raised two concerns that appear to 
go to the standard of non-arbitrariness, although even here it has not ex-
pressed itself in those terms. First, the committee asserted in 1998 that it had 
“specific concern” that “at least some of the persons kept in administrative 
detention for reasons of State security . . . do not personally threaten State 
security but are kept as ‘bargaining chips’ in order to promote negotiations 
with other parties.”106 This concern presumably goes to the requirement of 
non-arbitrariness, because Israel’s practice of detaining persons as bargain-
ing chips is not prohibited by any of the procedural constraints on detention. 
The implication is that detention is arbitrary (at least in the committee’s 
view) if it is based, not on an individualized assessment of necessity, but on 
a broader state interest unrelated to the particular persons being detained.107 
Israel later seemed to accept that view. In its subsequent report to the com-
mittee, Israel acknowledged that international law prohibits (again, presum-
ably as arbitrary) the detention of persons who do not themselves pose a 
security threat but who may be useful bargaining chips in future negotia-
tions.108  
Second, the committee has expressed concern with the duration of 
detention in Israel.109
 
This concern highlights but does not resolve a tension 
inherent in pure security-based detention. In the immigration context, the 
committee acknowledges that even rather lengthy detentions may be non-
arbitrary (recall that the detention in Ahani lasted nine years),110
 
so long as 
  
104 Id. ¶ 55. 
105 Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations: India, ¶ 24, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/79/Add.81 (Aug. 4, 1997). 
106 Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations: Israel, ¶ 21, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/79/Add.93 (Aug. 18, 1998) [hereinafter Human Rights Comm., Concluding Obser-
vations: Israel 1998].  
107 Cf. supra text accompanying note 96 (discussing requirement for individualized as-
sessment in cases involving immigration detention not based on national security concerns). 
108 See Human Rights Comm., Second Periodic Report Addendum: Israel, ¶¶ 125-28, U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/ISR/2001/2 (Dec. 4, 2001). 
109 Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations: Israel 1998, supra note 106, ¶ 21; 
Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations: Israel 2003, supra note 76, ¶ 13. 
110 Human Rights Comm., Ahani v. Canada, supra note 94. 
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the detaining state periodically reassesses the necessity of detention.111 Un-
like detentions predicated on deportation, however, pure security-based 
detentions have no intrinsic mechanism for establishing an end-date to de-
tention. Various actors have therefore suggested that such detention must in 
some way be temporally constrained—i.e., that an otherwise lawful deten-
tion may become arbitrary or unlawful if it is exceptionally lengthy or if 
there is a possibility that it could last indefinitely.112
 
Nevertheless, there is 
no shared understanding as to the point at which a detention becomes arbi-
trary by virtue of its duration.  
The committee’s jurisprudence on security-based detention thus 
fails to give any texture to the standard of non-arbitrariness. The committee 
repeatedly avoids that standard to emphasize, instead, the procedural con-
straints on detention. At best, the committee has suggested that detention 
may be arbitrary and therefore unlawful, if it is not based on an individua-
lized assessment of necessity or if it is unduly lengthy. Some states appear 
to accept those suggestions, but only in very narrow or unspecified terms.  
IV. INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE: GROPING FOR ALTERNATIVES  
At this point, one might reasonably argue that choosing a suitable 
detention model for non-battlefield terrorism suspects is essentially a judg-
ment call. An international legal argument may be made for each of the 
models (except possibly for the pure security-based administrative model 
under the ECHR), and none is cost-free. The armed-conflict model is con-
sistent with the preventative goals of non-battlefield detention, but its liberty 
  
111 See Human Rights Comm., A. v. Australia, supra note 78, ¶ 9.4 (“[E]very decision to 
keep a person in detention should be open to review periodically so the grounds justifying 
the detention can be assessed. In any event, detention should not continue beyond the period 
for which the State can provide appropriate justification.”); see also Human Rights Comm., 
Concluding Observations: Japan, ¶ 19, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.102 (Nov. 19, 1998) 
(noting that persons were detained for up to two years pending immigration proceedings but 
expressing concern only about the conditions of detention). 
112 See Human Rights Comm’n, Letter Dated 19 March 2002 from the Permanent Repre-
sentative of Singapore, at 3, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/157 (Mar. 25, 2002) [hereinafter Hu-
man Rights Comm’n Letter] (underscoring that the duration of pure security-based detention 
in Singapore is time-limited); Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations: Cameroon, 
¶ 19, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.116 (Nov. 3, 1999) (expressing concern that “a person held 
in administrative detention . . . may have his detention extended indefinitely”); ICJ MEMO, 
supra note 72, at 12; Drew R. Atkins, Customary International Humanitarian Law and Mul-
tinational Military Operations in Malaysia, 16 PAC. RIM. L. & POL'Y J. 79, 97 n.124 (2007) 
(noting the two-year limit to pure security-based detention in Malaysia); Pejic, supra note 52, 
at 382 (“[H]uman rights jurisprudence rejects the notion of indefinite detention.”); Sangeeta 
Shah, The UK’s Anti-Terror Legislation and the House of Lords: The First Skirmish, 5 HUM. 
RTS. L. REV. 403, 404-05 (2005) (describing the United Kingdom’s derogation from the 
ECHR and the ICCPR to accommodate post-9/11 legislation permitting indefinite detention).  
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costs are prohibitive: innocents easily could be detained, for extended pe-
riods if not for life, based only on a reasonable suspicion of threat and with-
out any judicial guarantees. The criminal model is substantially more pro-
tective of individual liberties, but if used exclusively in the fight against 
terrorism, it too carries with it potentially significant costs. States that have 
no choice but to charge, prosecute, and convict terrorism suspects will in-
evitably adjust the criminal law to enhance its preventative capacity. They 
therefore risk eroding the safeguards of their criminal justice systems and 
contaminating the law as it applies in more ordinary cases. These states also 
risk that some terrorism suspects identified by law enforcement and intelli-
gence services will go uncontained—either because they live in states that 
lack effective tools of law enforcement or because the tools used and infor-
mation available are incompatible with the process of criminal trial and 
conviction. Administrative detention is a potentially appealing in-between 
system. Human rights actors regularly acknowledge that security-based ad-
ministrative detention may be lawful, but as Part III demonstrated, they 
have failed to establish adequate substantive controls on such detention.   
This Part looks to international practice for guidance on the current 
status of the law, and on the direction in which it is moving. It demonstrates 
that international actors—and particularly western democracies that take 
seriously their human rights obligations, but also face a serious threat from 
transnational jihadi terrorism—are dissatisfied with both the armed-conflict 
model and exclusive reliance on the criminal model. Most states have de-
clined to apply the law of armed conflict to detain non-battlefield suspects 
because the liberty and public relations costs are too high. Yet several states 
have also demonstrated that they perceive an occasional but serious need to 
contain the threat from non-battlefield suspects outside the criminal process. 
In the absence of any international guidance for satisfying that need, these 
states have been willing to resort to a variety of ad hoc or uncontrolled 
measures.  
Some of these measures have been taken discreetly or have encoun-
tered strong condemnation; they therefore cannot be understood to reflect 
collective expectations on what the law does or should permit.113 But other 
measures—and specifically measures of administrative detention—have 
been pursued overtly, and with legislative and judicial participation. These 
latter measures have not all been upright, but they indicate that states are 
groping for an alternative legal framework within which to satisfy their per-
ceived security needs.  
  
113 With respect to identifying state expectations, see Andrew R. Willard, Incidents: An 
Essay on Method, in INTERNATIONAL INCIDENTS 25 (W. Michael Reisman & Andrew R. 
Willard eds., 1988). 
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A.  Rejecting the Armed-Conflict Approach  
The United States has almost singularly114 
 
asserted the authority to 
detain non-battlefield terrorism suspects based on the law of armed con-
flict.115
 
U.S. detention practices—under the CIA program and at Guantána-
mo Bay— have therefore been at the center of the international conversation 
on applying the law of armed conflict to non-battlefield suspects. The inter-
national reaction to these practices has been intensely negative. From a sys-
temic perspective, that reaction is strong evidence that the current law of 
armed conflict does not properly govern non-battlefield detentions.  
The United States has invoked the law of armed conflict to justify 
various forms of non-battlefield detention. Some non-battlefield suspects 
have been detained in secret CIA “dark sites” without any legal process at 
all.116
 
Others have been detained at Guantánamo Bay.117
 
Still others have 
been detained at secure facilities on U.S. soil.118
 
The common feature among 
all such detentions is their armed-conflict premise.   
The reaction to those detention practices from actors outside the 
United States has been extraordinarily negative. The facility at Guantánamo 
Bay, in particular, has become a symbol of injustice around the world,119 
  
114 But cf. Lynn Welchman, Rocks, Hard Places and Human Rights: Anti-Terrorism Law 
and Policy in Arab States, in GLOBAL ANTI-TERRORISM LAW AND POLICY, supra note 57, at 
581, 582 (“[T]housands have been arrested in Arab states, many held for prolonged periods 
without trial.”); Michael Slackman, Saudis Round Up 172, Citing A Plot Against Oil Rigs, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2007, at A1 (reporting on the arrest and detention of 172 persons con-
nected to a terrorist ring, and quoting a Saudi official as asserting that there is “still a war 
going on” against terrorism). 
115 See supra note 6; infra notes 116-118 and accompanying text. 
116 See President’s Speech on Military Commissions, supra note 9 (asserting that the CIA 
detention program holds “a small number of suspected terrorist leaders and operatives cap-
tured during the war”) (emphasis added); Monica Hakimi, The Council of Europe Addresses 
CIA Rendition and Detention Program, 101 AM. J. INT'L L. 442, 442 (2007) (discussing and 
collecting sources on the CIA program). 
117 For recent government arguments that premise Guantánamo detentions on an armed 
conflict, see Brief for Respondent at 2, Boumediene v. Bush, No. 06-1195 (U.S. Oct. 9, 
2007); Brief for Respondent at 2, 7-8, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006) (No. 05-
184). 
118 Al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160 (4th Cir. 2007), reh’g en banc granted, No. 06-7427 
(4th Cir. Aug. 22, 2007) (non-citizen captured and detained as an enemy combatant in the 
United States); Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386 (4th Cir. 2005) (U.S. citizen captured and 
detained as an enemy combatant in the United States).   
119 See, e.g., Alan Cowell, Briton Wants Guantánamo Closed, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2006, 
at A24 (quoting the British attorney general as asserting that “[t]he existence of Guantánamo 
remains unacceptable” and that it has become “a symbol to many—right or wrong—of injus-
tice”); Mark Mazzetti, General Rejects Call to Penalize Ex-Guantanamo Prison Chief, L.A. 
TIMES, July 13, 2005, at A11 (“The U.S. prison at Guantanamo Bay has been the source of 
intense anger throughout the Arab world.”); Thom Shanker & David E. Sanger, New to Pen-
tagon, Gates Argued for Closing Guantánamo, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2007, at A1 (quoting 
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such that even close European allies of the United States demand that it be 
closed.120
 
International human rights bodies have been even more outspo-
ken. These bodies have focused on the deficiencies of legal process availa-
ble to terrorism detainees in U.S. custody.121 
 
The Human Rights Committee 
and the Committee Against Torture have each criticized the insufficiency of 
legal process at Guantánamo Bay,122
  
and the Council of Europe has con-
demned the absence of any legal process under the CIA program.123
 
Finally, 
the heads of five mechanisms under the U.N. Human Rights Commission 
have concluded that non-battlefield detainees at Guantánamo should be ei-
ther subjected to criminal process or released.124 
 
The U.N. Secretary-
General publicly supported that conclusion, asserting that “the basic point 
that one cannot detain individuals in perpetuity and that charges have to be 
brought against them and their being given a chance to explain themselves 
and be prosecuted, charged or released . . . is something that is common 
under any legal system.”125
 
 
   
Defense Secretary Gates as acknowledging that the detention facility at Guantánamo Bay has 
“become so tainted abroad”).  
120 See, e.g., John R. Crook, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to Inter-
national Law: International Human Rights, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 214, 232-36 (2006) (noting 
the positions of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany); Hunger Strike at Guantanamo 
Prison Grows to 89 Inmates, L.A. TIMES, June 2, 2006, at A23 (Germany, Denmark, and 
United Kingdom); Dafna Linzer & Glenn Kessler, Decision to Move Detainees Resolved 
Two-Year Debate Among Bush Advisers, WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 2006, at A1 (Europe gener-
ally); Elaine Sciolino, Spanish Judge Calls for Closing U.S. Prison at Guantánamo, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 4, 2006, at A6 (Spain and United Kingdom); Craig Whitlock, Europeans Cheer 
Ruling on Guantanamo Trials, WASH. POST, June 30, 2006, at A8 (Europe generally).  
121 See, e.g., U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm. on Human Rights, Situation 
of Detainees at Guantánamo Bay, ¶¶ 21, 25, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/120 (Feb. 15, 2006) 
[hereinafter Comm. on Human Rights, Situation of Detainees]; Eur. Comm. for Democracy 
Through Law, Opinion on the International Legal Obligations of Council of Europe Member 
States in Respect of Secret Detention Facilities and Inter-State Transport of Prisoners, ¶¶ 
78-85, Doc. No. CDL-AD(2006)009 (Mar. 2006); Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, The Relev-
ance of IHL in the Context of Terrorism (July 21, 2005), http://www.cicr.org/web/eng/site 
eng0.nsf/html/terrorism-ihl-210705(rejecting the notion of a global armed conflict and then 
asserting that “when a person suspected of terrorist activities is not detained in connection 
with any armed conflict, humanitarian law does not apply”). 
122 See Comm. Against Torture, Conclusions and Recommendations: United States of 
America, ¶ 22, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/USA/CO/2 (July 25, 2006); Human Rights Comm., Con-
sideration of Reports Submitted By States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant, ¶ 18, 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/Rev.1 (Dec. 18, 2006). 
123 See Hakimi, supra note 116, at 446. 
124 Comm. on Human Rights, Situation of Detainees, supra note 121, ¶ 95.  
125  See Warren Hoge, Investigators for UN Urge U.S. to Close Guantánamo, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 17, 2006, at A6 (internal quotation marks omitted).   
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B. . . . . But Evading the Criminal Process Discreetly  
Most international actors have therefore declined to apply the law 
of armed conflict to detain non-battlefield suspects. But the fact that other 
actors have rejected the U.S. approach—and the overt use of the legal tools 
under the law of armed conflict—does not mean that they fail to appreciate 
the threat from transnational jihadi groups, or the armed-conflict attributes 
of the fight against them. Even states that publicly criticize the U.S. ap-
proach have demonstrated that (at least in certain cases) they also perceive 
advantages to it, or that they otherwise share the goal of responding to the 
threat from non-battlefield suspects without resort to the criminal process.126
 
 
Several states have participated covertly in the very U.S. detention 
practices that they publicly condemn.127
 
The extent of such participation has 
varied. A few states have held and interrogated non-battlefield detainees in 
coordination with the United States.128 But these states have notoriously 
poor human rights records, so their practice is not necessarily reflective of 
the direction of international law in this area. The participation of other 
states— including those that take their human rights obligations seriously—
  
 126   That other states share that goal is also evident from various public statements they have 
made. For instance, the former Defense Minister of the United Kingdom has suggested revis-
ing the law of armed conflict to address terrorism-related detentions. See David Ignatius, 
Editorial, A Way Out of Guantanamo Bay, WASH. POST, July 7, 2006, at A17. Austrian offi-
cials have acknowledged that Guantánamo Bay occupies a legal “gray area,” id., and have 
proposed that Europe and the United States work together to establish a new “framework” 
for terrorism-related renditions. Temporary Comm. on the Alleged Use of European Coun-
tries by the CIA for the Transp. & Illegal Detention of Prisoners, Report on the Alleged Use 
of European Countries by the CIA for the Transportation and Illegal Detention of Prisoners, 
¶ 25, EUR. PARL. Doc. A6-0020/2007 (Jan. 30, 2007) (prepared by Giovanni Claudio Fava) 
[hereinafter EU Report on CIA]. Australian and Italian officials have publicly supported 
detentions under the CIA program. See John Ward Anderson, Confirmation of CIA Prisons 
Leaves Europeans Mistrustful, WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 2006, at A8 (reporting on statement by 
the Australian foreign minister supporting the CIA program); Tracy Wilkens, Court Widens 
Net for 22 CIA Agents to EU, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2005, at A3 (reporting on statement by 
then Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi that the CIA operation against Abu Omar was “justi-
fiable”). Finally, German officials are now advocating the establishment of a system of extra-
criminal detention in that country. See Mark Landler, Debate on Terror Threat Stirs Germa-
ny, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2007, at A1. 
127  See generally EU Report on CIA, supra note 126 (finding that European States ac-
quiesced or participated in U.S. detentions); COE Report, supra note 13 (same); see also 
Jimmy Burns, et al., Comment & Analysis, Render unto Washington: US Tactics on Terror 
Are Making Europe Examine its Complicity, FIN. TIMES (U.K.), Dec. 14, 2005, at 17 (report-
ing on the “uneasy arrangements by which European governments have appeared to collude 
with the U.S. in practices that they have rarely been willing to defend, criticise or even ac-
knowledge”).   
128   See COE Report, supra note 13, ¶¶ 202-03 (naming Morocco); Jane Mayer, Outsourc-
ing Torture: Annals of Justice, NEW YORKER MAG., Feb. 14, 2005, at 106, 107 (naming 
Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Syria). 
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has been more subtle. For instance, there is some evidence that, under 
NATO auspices, European states permitted the United States to use their 
airspace to transport non-battlefield detainees into custody.129
 
There also is 
strong evidence that European and other states shared intelligence giving 
rise to detentions;130
 
interrogated detainees already in custody;131
 
declined to 
accept their nationals or residents back into their territories, cognizant that 
the alternative would be continued detention;132 
 
and hosted CIA detention 
facilities in their territories.133 Finally, the evidence indicates that several 
states have themselves captured non-battlefield terrorism suspects and then 
transferred them into U.S. or another state’s custody for extended, extra-
criminal detention.134 
States have also evaded the criminal process by deporting non-
battlefield suspects despite the risk that the suspects would be mistreated in 
  
129   See Council of Eur., Comm. on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Secret Detentions and 
Illegal Transfers of Detainees Involving Council of Europe Member States: Second Report, 
¶¶ 72-83, EUR. PARL. Doc. 11302 rev. (June 11, 2007) (prepared by Dick Marty) [hereinafter 
COE Second Report]. 
130   See COMM'N OF INQUIRY INTO THE ACTIONS OF CANADIAN OFFICIALS IN RELATION TO 
MAHER ARER, REPORT OF THE EVENTS RELATING TO MAHER ARER: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 13-14 (2006),available at http://www.ararcommission.ca/eng/AR_ 
English.pdf (Canada); COE Report, supra note 13, ¶¶ 163-76 (United Kingdom).   
131  See COE Report, supra note 13, ¶ 201 (United Kingdom); id. ¶¶ 187, 191 (Germany); 
Mark Landler & Souad Mekhennet, Freed German Detainee Questions His Country’s Role, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2006, at A8; Craig Smith, Leak Disrupts French Terror Trial, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 6, 2006, at A8. 
132  See, e.g., Landler & Mekhennet, supra note 131, at A8 (Germany); Whitlock, supra note 
120, at A8 (Europe); Craig Whitlock, U.S. Faces Obstacles to Freeing Detainees, WASH. 
POST, Oct. 17, 2006, at A1 (United Kingdom, Germany, and “other European States”). 
133   See COE Second Report, supra note 129, ¶¶ 70, 117 (Thailand, Romania, and Poland).   
134 See, e.g., Comm. Against Torture, Communication No. 233/2003, U.N. Doc. 
CAT/C/34/D/233/2003 (May 24, 2005) [hereinafter Comm. Against Torture, Agiza v. Swe-
den] (Sweden); COE Report, supra note 13, ¶¶ 133-49 (Bosnia & Herzegovina); id. ¶¶ 94-
132 (Macedonia); EU Report on CIA, supra note 126, ¶¶ 49-53 (Italy); Stockman, supra note 
64 (Indonesia); Raymond Bonner, Indonesia Brings New Case Against Cleric Tied to Terror, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2004, at A7 (Thailand); Mark Denbeaux & Joshua W. Denbeaux, Re-
port on Guantanamo Detainees: A Profile of 517 Detainees Through Analysis of Department 
of Defense Data 14 (Seton Hall Pub. Law, Working Paper No. 46, 2006), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=885659 (Pakistan). The evidence suggests that, in some cases, gov-
ernments acquiesced in extra-criminal detentions after it became apparent that they had no 
other option for incapacitating the terrorism suspect. See, e.g., John Crewdson, Italy Says 
CIA May Have Had Distorted View of Cleric, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 8, 2007, at CN12 (reporting 
evidence that some Italian officials considered Abu Omar to be a threat in Italy but that they 
could not deport him because of a prior grant of political asylum); Craig Whitlock, At Guan-
tanamo, Caught in a Legal Trap, WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 2006, at A1 (reporting that the Unit-
ed States detained the “Algerian six” at Guantánamo Bay after Bosnian-Herzegovinian 
courts ordered the local government to release them from criminal detention and prohibited it 
from deporting them). 
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their home countries. In the counterterrorism context, deportation is fre-
quently from a western democracy to a country that is ambivalent about 
human rights and that has an independent interest in containing the jihadi 
threat. Deportation thus may result in arbitrary detention, detainee mi-
streatment, or execution in the detainee’s home country. Human rights law 
generally prohibits refoulement where there is a real risk of such mistreat-
ment, but states increasingly cope with that prohibition by obtaining from 
the receiving state diplomatic assurances that deported suspects will not be 
mistreated.135 These assurances are often unreliable.136
 
Western democracies 
nevertheless use them to deport terrorism suspects because the alternative 
may be an uncontained threat in their own territories.137
 
The diplomatic as-
surances thus provide a cover for potentially unlawful refoulements.  
  
 135  HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, STILL AT RISK: DIPLOMATIC ASSURANCES NO SAFEGUARD 
AGAINST TORTURE (2005), http://hrw.org/reports/2005/eca0405/index.htm (reviewing prac-
tices of the United States, Canada, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Netherlands, Austria, and 
Turkey); Katrin Bennhold, Europe, Too, Takes Harder Line in Handling Terrorism Suspects, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2006, at A1 (citing Sweden, Germany, the Netherlands, Austria, and 
the United Kingdom). 
136  See Comm. Against Torture, Agiza v. Sweden, supra note 134, ¶ 13.4 (“The procurement 
of diplomatic assurances, which, moreover, provided no mechanism for their enforcement, 
did not suffice to protect against this manifest risk [of torture upon deportation].”); Comm. 
On Human Rights, Civil and Political Rights, Including the Questions of Torture and Deten-
tion, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/6 (Dec. 23, 2005) (prepared by Manfred Nowak); HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 135. 
137 Three cases recently decided or now pending before the European Court of Human 
Rights consider whether, when deporting a terrorism suspect, a state may balance the risk of 
home-country mistreatment against the national security threat of having the suspect uncon-
tained in its own territory: Saadi v. Italy, App. 37201/06 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008); A. v. Nether-
lands, App. 4900/06 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2006); and Ramzy v. Netherlands, App. 25424/05 Eur. 
Ct. H.R. (2005). See Press Release, European Court of Human Rights, Application Lodged 
with the Court Ramzy v. The Netherlands (Oct. 20, 2005), available at http://www.echr.coe
.int/eng/press/2005/oct/applicationlodgedramzyvnetherlands.htm; EUROPEAN COURT OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS, ANNUAL ACTIVITY REPORT 2006, § 3, 9 (2007), available at http://www.ech
r.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/D8BFD30E-EB6B-4FB9-86398990064DB046/0/CompilationofSec 
tionreports.pdf (providing information regarding A. v. Netherlands). The United Kingdom 
intervened in the Saadi case, and it and a few other states intervened in the other two cases, 
arguing that, where the security threat posed by the terrorism suspect is grave, the state 
should be permitted to deport him even if there is a real risk that he will be mistreated in his 
home country. See Observations of the Governments of Lithuania, Portugal, Slovakia, and 
the United Kingdom, Ramzy v. Netherlands, App. 4900/06 Eur. Ct. H.R., available at 
http://www.redress.org/publications/GovernmentintervenorsobservationsinRamzy%20case22 
November.pdf; Press Release, Amnesty Int’l, European Court of Human Rights: Ban on 
Torture is Absolute and Universal (July 11, 2007), available at http://news.amnesty.org/inde 
x/ENGIOR300162007. In the Saadi case, however, the European Court of Human Rights 
rejected that argument, concluding that the ECHR’s implicit prohibition against refoulement 
is absolute. Saadi, supra ¶ 139. Separately, Canada acknowledges that in unspecified “excep-
tional circumstances” it may lawfully deport a terrorism suspect irrespective of the risk of 
home-country mistreatment. See Suresh v. Canada, [2002] S.C.R. 3, 46. 
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These measures demonstrate that states perceive an occasional but 
serious need to evade the criminal process in order to contain the threat 
from non-battlefield suspects. Thus, although many states have publicly 
condemned U.S. detention practices, several have also participated in those 
practices. Likewise, several states have sought to deport terrorism suspects 
despite the risk of home-country mistreatment. Yet the fact that these meas-
ures were or are employed covertly (or under inaccurate pretenses) signals 
that states consider them legally suspect and are generally unwilling to push 
for a change in the law to permit them.138  
C.  . . . And Through Administrative Detention  
In addition to evading the criminal process discreetly, several states 
have sought to contain the threat posed by non-battlefield suspects by expe-
rimenting with administrative detention. Most of these experiments have 
been public and subject to legislative and judicial oversight. The broad use 
of such detention indicates that, although states perceive an occasional need 
to contain the threat posed by non-battlefield suspects without resort to the 
criminal process, and although they sometimes are willing to satisfy that 
need in legally suspect ways, they also appreciate the benefits to working 
within a prescribed legal framework. 
  
138 Indeed, most of the participation by other states in U.S. detention practices was denied 
or investigated when it became public. Canada established a commission to review its role in 
the detention and mistreatment of Maher Arar. See Commission of Inquiry into the Actions 
of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar, http://www.ararcommission.ca (last visited 
Mar. 31, 2008). In Germany, arrest warrants were issued relating to the abduction of Khaled 
el-Masri. See Mark Landler, German Court Confronts U.S. on Abduction, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
1, 2007, at A1; Craig Whitlock, Germans Charge 13 CIA Operatives, WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 
2007, at A1. Italian prosecutors have indicted twenty-six Americans and five Italians in the 
Abu Omar case. See Richard Owen, CIA Agents Must Be Charged over “Kidnap and Tor-
ture,” Says Judge, TIMES (London), Feb. 17, 2007, at 39. Sweden has initiated an internal 
investigation into its deportation of an Egyptian imam to Egypt. See Craig Whitlock, A Se-
cret Deportation of Terror Suspects, WASH. POST, July 25, 2004, at A1. And Spain and Por-
tugal are each investigating whether CIA aircraft carrying detainees transited their airspace 
or stopped for refueling in their territories. See Spain Probes “Secret CIA Flights,” BBC 
NEWS, Nov. 15, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4439036.stm; Associated Press, 
Report: Portugal Opens Criminal Investigation into Alleged CIA Flights, INT'L HERALD 
TRIB., Feb. 5, 2007, http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/02/05/europe/EU-GEN-Portugal-
CIA-Flights.php. Notably, two European states (Germany and Italy) have obstructed judicial 
investigations into non-battlefield detentions by invoking “state secrets” protections. See
COE Second Report, supra note 129, ¶ 5. For one exception, where a few states have pushed 
for a change in the law, see the discussion supra note 137 regarding the Saadi case.  
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1.  Detention Predicated on Criminal or Immigration Proceedings  
In most instances, western democracies predicate security-based 
administrative detention on future criminal or immigration proceedings. By 
predicating detention on those other proceedings, these states contain the 
scope of application of the administrative detention regime and purport to 
avoid the form of detention that is more suspect under international law. 
This Subsection demonstrates, however, that security-based detention predi-
cated on other proceedings may easily but informally convert into pure se-
curity-based detention, but without adequate controls.   
With respect to future criminal proceedings, a number of states now 
permit extended pre-charge detention in terrorism cases. Under legislation 
passed in 2006, the U.K. government may detain terrorism suspects without 
charge for up to twenty-eight days,139
 
in contrast to the four days permitted 
for non-terrorism-related suspects.140
 
In Spain, the government may now 
detain terrorism suspects without charge for up to thirteen days, as opposed 
to the usual three.141
 
And in France, that period is now six days instead of 
two.142
 
The purported purpose of extending the permissible period of pre-
charge detention is to give the authorities more time to investigate terror-
ism-related offenses, which may be more difficult to investigate than other 
crimes. Yet extended detention may be permitted without any rigorous 
showing that it is necessary or justified in a particular case, and future crim-
inal charges are not always forthcoming. States that extend the permissible 
period of pre-charge detention in terrorism cases, and that ultimately release 
  
 139  Terrorism Act, 2006, c.11, § 23 (U.K.); Alan Cowell, Britain Arrests 9 Suspects in Ter-
rorist Kidnapping Plot, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2007, at A3. U.K. security officials now consider 
the twenty-eight-day period of pre-charge detention to be insufficient and have been advocat-
ing for extending it still further. See Alan Cowell, 7 Men Sentenced in Qaeda Bomb Plot in 
the U.S. and Britain, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2007, at A3; Jane Perlez, British Leader Seeks 
New Terrorism Laws, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2007, at A12. 
140 See JAGO RUSSELL, LIBERTY, TERRORISM PRE-CHARGE DETENTION COMPARATIVE LAW 
STUDY 17 (2007) [hereinafter LIBERTY STUDY], available at http://www.liberty-human-
rights.org.uk/issues/pdfs/pre-charge-detention-comparative-law-study.pdf.   
 141  There is some disagreement in the literature on whether the thirteen-day detention must 
be predicated on future criminal charges or is pure security-based detention. In either event, 
this period of detention is longer than was ordinarily permissible. See HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH, SETTING AN EXAMPLE? COUNTER-TERRORISM MEASURES IN SPAIN 1-2, 24-26 (2005) 
available at http://hrw.org/reports/ 2005/spain0105/spain0105.pdf; LIBERTY STUDY, supra 
note 140, at 48; JACK STRAW, FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, COUNTER-TERRORISM 
LEGISLATION AND PRACTICE: A SURVEY OF SELECTED COUNTRIES 26 (2005). 
 142 Code de procédure pénale [C. Proc. Pén.] [Code of Criminal Procedure] [2007] arts. 63, 
706-88; LIBERTY STUDY, supra note 140, at 38; Bennhold, supra note 135; AFX News, 
French Parliament Adopts Tough Anti-Terrorism Law, FORBES.COM, Dec. 22, 2005, 
http://www.forbes.com/ work/feeds/afx/2005/12/22/afx2410169.html. 
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a large percentage of detainees without filing any charges, thus employ sys-
tems of short-term, pure security-based detention.143
 
 
France also predicates more long-term detentions on future criminal 
proceedings. Under French law, terrorism suspects may be detained for up 
to four years while they are criminally investigated and before any trial, so 
long as they are charged with a terrorism-related offense.144
 
This technically 
is not administrative detention because the suspect has actually been 
charged with an offense. But terrorism offenses in France are often vaguely 
defined, and charges may be based only on suspicion, with the understand-
ing that the special magistrate judge assigned to the case will conduct most 
of the investigation after the defendant is charged.145 This system thus 
overtly permits long-term detention without any rigorous demonstration of 
necessity or prior wrongdoing.146
 
Moreover, such detention frequently is, for 
all intents and purposes, pure security-based detention. Many suspects have 
been detained for years and then released without trial or conviction.147  
With respect to future immigration proceedings, several western 
democracies now detain terrorism suspects pending deportation.148  For in-
stance, in Canada the government may detain a foreign national pending 
deportation where there are “reasonable grounds to believe that [he poses] a 
  
 143  See U.K. Home Office Terrorism and the Law, http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/security/ 
terrorism-and-the-law/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2008) (reporting that of the 1166 terrorism sus-
pects arrested in the United Kingdom between September 11, 2001 and March 31, 2007, 669 
were released without charge). 
144   See Bennhold, supra note 135. 
 145  French law categorizes as a terrorism-related offense a wide variety of conduct commit-
ted with the purpose of seriously disrupting public order through intimidation. That category 
includes the broad offense of “participation in any group . . . established with a view” to 
committing acts of terrorism (evinced by at least one material act). Code pénal [C. Pén.] 
[Penal Code] [2007] art. 421-2-1; see also id. art. 421-1 (setting forth most terrorism-related 
offenses). 
146  See Jeffrey Fleishman et al., Outraged Europeans Take Dimmer View of Diversity, L.A. 
TIMES, Sept. 5, 2005, at A4 (“Anti-terrorism magistrates [in France] have extensive powers 
enabling them to jail suspects for up to four years pending trial on minimal evidence.”). 
147  See Sandro Contenta, “Sheriff” Keeping Eye on Canada, TORONTO STAR, Nov. 10, 
2002, at B3, available at LEXIS; Michael Dobbs, In France, Judge Fights Terrorism and 
Critics, WASH. POST, Nov. 23, 2001, at A34; Craig Whitlock, French Push Limits in Fight on 
Terrorism, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2004, at A1. 
 148 See, e.g., Teresa A. Miller, Blurring the Boundaries Between Immigration and Crime 
Control After September 11th, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 81, 89-91 (2005) (United States); 
Austrian Minister Defends Jail-for-Refugees Initiative, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, Nov. 2, 
2004 (Austria); Roundup: Yemini Imam in German Jail May Face Long Legal Hearings, 
DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, Jan. 13, 2003 (Germany); infra notes 149-158 and accompany-
ing text (Canada and United Kingdom); cf. Fleishman et al., supra note 146 (“From Rome to 
Paris to Berlin, governments are rethinking the balance between civil rights and national 
security, proposing tighter immigration and asylum laws . . . .”). 
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danger to national security or to the safety of any person.”149 In its 2007 
decision in Charkaoui v. Canada, the Canadian Supreme Court reviewed 
Canada’s practice of detaining persons for several years “pending deporta-
tion,” based on that reasonable belief standard.150
 
The Court held that such 
lengthy and indeterminate periods of detention are lawful, so long as the 
judicial review afforded to detainees is made more meaningful, and specifi-
cally so long as detainees are given the information based on which deten-
tion was ordered or, if that information is classified, a substantial substitute 
for it.151 
 
The Court did not consider the legality of detentions “pending de-
portation” where deportation has become practically infeasible (for exam-
ple, because of the risk of home-country mistreatment),152 even though Can-
ada has engaged in such detentions.153  Thus, because the deportation of 
terrorism suspects is frequently either protracted or infeasible, security-
based immigration detention in Canada may be only loosely tied to, or even 
completely unhinged from, deportation proceedings.  These detentions have 
essentially converted into pure security-based detentions, permitted under a 
low, reasonable belief standard.  
Whereas the Charkaoui Court avoided the question of indefinite 
immigration detention, the House of Lords of the United Kingdom was con-
fronted with exactly that question in A. v. Home Secretary, a 2004 case 
challenging post-9/11 legislation that permitted the government to detain 
indefinitely any alien who was reasonably believed to pose a security threat 
but who would not leave the United Kingdom voluntarily and could not be 
returned to his home country because of a real risk of mistreatment.154 
 
Be-
cause the legislation permitted detention in the absence of pending deporta-
tion proceedings, it explicitly permitted pure security-based detention, but 
only of foreign nationals. In the government’s view, such detention was 
preferable to the available alternatives: leaving the suspect uncontained in 
the United Kingdom or returning him to his home country, where he faced 
  
 149  Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, 2001 S.C., ch. 27, § 82 (Can.).   
150  See Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2007] S.C.R. 350.   
151 Id. at 387-90. As originally drafted, the legislation required the government to afford a 
detainee the opportunity for judicial review within forty-eight hours if he was a permanent 
resident, or after 120 days if he was not. However, the Canadian Supreme Court found that 
the 120-day “grace period,” during which a non-national, non-resident could be detained 
without judicial review, was impermissibly long. Id. at 403. 
152  Charkaoui, [2007] S.C.R. at 417. 
 153 See Kent Roach, Must We Trade Rights For Security? The Choice Between Smart, 
Harsh, or Proportionate Security Strategies in Canada and Britain, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 
2151, 2194 (2006). 
 154 A. v. Home Secretary, [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 A.C. 68 (appeal taken from Eng.) 
(U.K.). 
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the real risk of extended detention plus mistreatment.155 
 
The Law Lords 
determined, however, that the indefinite detention of foreign nationals was 
disproportionate to the exigencies of the situation.156
 
Since that decision, the 
United Kingdom has continued to employ security-based immigration de-
tention, but not on the understanding that immigration detainees may be 
held indefinitely.157  The government sometimes avoids the perception of 
indefinite detention by seeking or obtaining from the suspect’s home coun-
try diplomatic assurances that he will not be mistreated if deported.158
 
 
2.  Pure Security-Based Detention  
In rarer instances, western democracies have candidly developed 
systems of pure security-based detention. India and Israel—two states with 
long histories of trying to combat transnational terrorism—consistently have 
used such detention for that purpose.159
 
So too have more authoritarian 
  
 155  The international prohibition of refoulement made it unlawful for the United Kingdom to 
return these suspects to their home countries, but, because indefinite security-based detention 
is also presumably unlawful under the ECHR, and dubious under the ICCPR, the United 
Kingdom derogated from the detention provisions of both instruments to accommodate its 
new legislation. Shah, supra note 112, at 404-05. 
 156  A. v. Home Secretary, 2 A.C. 68. For a more thorough discussion of A. v. Home Secre-
tary, see Shah, supra note 112, at 406; and Clive Walker, Clamping Down on Terrorism in 
the United Kingdom, 4 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 1137 (2006). 
157  See LORD ALEX CARLILE, FIRST REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT REVIEWER PURSUANT TO 
SECTION 14(3) OF THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM ACT 2005, at 6-8 (2006) [hereinafter FIRST  
CARLILE REPORT], available at http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/news-publications/publicat 
ion-search/prevention-terrorism-act-2005/laws-againstterror.pdf?view=Binary. 
158  See id.; Matthew Hickley, Judges Let Two Libyan Terror Suspects Back on Our Streets, 
DAILY MAIL (U.K.), Apr. 28, 2007, at 13 (“The Home Office has signed memoranda of un-
derstanding with Libya, Jordan and Lebanon and reached a similar deal with Algeria in the 
hope of deporting foreign terror suspects to countries with questionable human rights records 
where there is not enough evidence to prosecute them in Britain.”). U.K. courts have found 
that deportation proceedings could not proceed, despite the diplomatic assurances obtained, 
in at least two cases. See Joshua Rozenburg, Terror Suspects Cannot Be Deported to Libya, 
Says Court, DAILY TELEGRAPH (U.K.), Apr. 28, 2007, at 6 (“Two Libyans found to pose a 
danger to national security are likely to be released on bail next week after a court ruled that 
they could not be sent back to their own country.”). 
159  See supra notes 102-109 and accompanying text. For more current information on the 
systems of administrative detention in India and Israel, see Christopher Gagné, Note, POTA: 
Lessons Learned From India’s Anti-Terror Act, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 261 (2005); and 
Joanne Mariner, Indefinite Detention of Terrorist Suspects, FINDLAW, June 10, 2002, 
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/ mariner/20020610.html (Israel). 
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states, like Singapore and Malaysia.160
 
This Subsection looks at the more 
recent practice of the United Kingdom and the United States.161  
The United Kingdom responded to the A. v. Home Secretary case 
by passing new legislation in 2005 permitting it to impose on persons of any 
nationality various liberty-restricting orders, including in serious cases pure 
security-based detention.162
 
Liberty-restricting orders short of detention have 
included restrictions on movement and prohibitions on access to specific 
items or services.163
 
Detention is contemplated as an extreme measure taken 
with judicial oversight and where the alternatives have been exhausted or 
rejected as insufficient. Moreover, for anyone subject to detention or other 
liberty-restricting orders, the government must consider the possibility of a 
criminal prosecution.164
 
Pure security-based detention thus is permitted in 
the United Kingdom only if necessary, in that the security threat cannot be 
contained by less restrictive measures or by the criminal process. In prac-
  
160  See Human Rights Comm’n Letter, supra note 112 (Singapore); Atkins, supra note 112, 
at 97 n.124 (Malaysia). 
 161  Australia also seems to permit pure security-based detention in the event that there are 
“reasonable grounds to suspect” that a person is participating in or possesses something in 
connection with an “imminent” attack. See Katherine Nesbitt, Preventative Detention of 
Terrorist Suspects in Australia and the United States: A Comparative Constitutional Analysis 
45-48 (Mar. 22, 2007) (unpublished manuscript available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=9757
92).
162  See Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2005, c.2 (U.K.); see also FIRST CARLILE REPORT, 
supra note 157; LORD ALEX CARLILE, SECOND REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT 
REVIEWER PURSUANT TO SECTION 14(3) OF THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM 
ACT 2005 (2007) [hereinafter SECOND CARLILE REPORT], available at 
http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/news-publications/publication-search/ prevention-terrorism 
-act-2005/Lord-Carlile-pta-report-2006.pdf?view=Binary. 
163   See FIRST CARLILE REPORT, supra note 157, at 1. 
 164  Prevention of Terrorism Act of 2005, c.2, §§ 8(2), 8(4) (U.K.). To date, criminal prose-
cutions of persons restricted under the 2005 legislation have been rare. See FIRST CARLILE 
REPORT, supra note 157, at 18-19; SECOND CARLILE REPORT, supra note 162, at 24-26; LORD 
CARLILE, THIRD REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT REVIEWER PURSUANT TO SECTION 14(3) OF THE 
PREVENTION OF TERRORISM ACT OF 2005, at 27-28 (2008) [hereinafter THIRD CARLILE 
REPORT], available at http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/news-publications/publication-
search/general/report-control-orders2008?view=Binary. Law enforcement officials attribute 
that failure to “there [not being] evidence available that could realistically be used for the 
purposes of a terrorism prosecution.” SECOND CARLILE REPORT, supra note 162, at 25. De-
spite the unavailability of such evidence, however, the decision to impose liberty-restricting 
measures has, in every case, been supported by the independent reviewer charged with over-
seeing implementation of the 2005 legislation. See THIRD CARLILE REPORT, supra at 13; 
SECOND CARLILE REPORT, supra note 162, at 13; FIRST CARLILE REPORT, supra note 157, at 
12. This suggests that the measures respond to a threat that the British government has not 
been able to address through the ordinary criminal process. Notably, however, some liberty-
restricting measures have also been ineffective in containing the threat; a few suspects sub-
ject to such measures have subsequently disappeared and thus can no longer be monitored. 
See Philip Johnston, DNA Loophole Is Hindering Terror Police, Says Reid, DAILY 
TELEGRAPH (U.K.), June 8, 2007, at 12. 
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tice, this system has been more constrained than the systems of detention 
discussed above that are predicated on future criminal and immigration pro-
ceedings. As of February 2008, the United Kingdom had not detained any-
one under the 2005 legislation.165
 
 
For its part, the United States now employs a system of pure securi-
ty-based administrative detention at Guantánamo Bay. Even though the 
United States continues to assert the authority to detain both battlefield and 
non-battlefield terrorism suspects at Guantánamo Bay on the basis of the 
law of armed conflict,166
  
ongoing litigation has compelled the United States 
to better regulate that detention scheme so that it increasingly resembles a 
system of pure security-based administrative detention. The litigation in the 
United States has focused on whether Guantánamo detainees may challenge 
the legalit y of their detentions in U.S. federal court. The availability of fed-
eral court review is, of course, not required under the law of armed conflict, 
but the U.S. Supreme Court has declined to apply that law, in its pure form, 
to Guantánamo detainees. In its 2004 decision in Rasul v. Bush, the Court 
determined that federal courts had (statutory) habeas jurisdiction to review 
the legality of detentions at Guantánamo Bay,167 
 
and it justified that deter-
mination in part by distinguishing the Guantánamo Bay detainees from de-
tainees in more conventional armed conflicts.168
 
 
The Rasul Court did not answer whether its jurisdictional ruling ap-
plied to all non-battlefield detainees held outside the United States, or only 
to those at Guantánamo Bay. It also did not identify the substantive law 
under which the Guantánamo detentions should be reviewed. It thus did not 




165   See THIRD CARLILE REPORT, supra note 164, at 19.  
 166  Brief for Respondent at 2, 7-8, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006) (No. 05-
184). 
 167   542 U.S. 466, 485 (2004). 
168   Id. at 476. 
 169  The U.S. Supreme Court has issued three other detainee decisions, but none is clear on 
whether, in the Court’s view, the law of armed conflict properly governs non-battlefield 
detentions. Some of its jurisprudence suggests that it believes the law of armed conflict does 
govern. For instance, in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004), the Court reviewed the 
detention of a U.S. national captured on the Afghan battlefield. The Court determined that 
the authority to detain that person was inherent in the congressional grant of authority to use 
force “‘against those nations, organizations, or persons’” connected to the September 11 
attacks. Id. at 510 (quoting Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 
2(a), 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (Supp. I 2001))). That grant of au-
thority is certainly expansive enough to also authorize the use of force in a global fight 
against al Qaeda. If, as Hamdi asserts, the authority to detain is inherent in the grant of au-
thority to use force, then one logical extension of Hamdi is to understand the Congress to 
have authorized armed-conflict detentions of all Qaeda members, irrespective of whether 
they are captured on a conventional battlefield. The Court seemed to endorse that under-
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Rasul has since been legislatively reversed (twice),171
 
and the debate 
in the United States continues on the extent to which the law of armed con-
flict governs non-battlefield detentions, and on the legal process due to de-
tainees.172  After Rasul, the United States established administrative bo-
dies—termed Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs)—to determine 
whether detention at Guantánamo Bay is in each case justified.173 
 
Congres-
   
standing in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S.Ct. 2749, 2795 (2006), when it applied only Com-
mon Article 3 to detainees captured in the “conflict with al Qaeda.”   
  When addressing the specific issue of detention, however, the Court has indicated that 
the law of armed conflict may not govern, or at least that it may not govern alone. In Hamdi, 
the Court emphasized the narrowness of its holding and concluded that the citizen-detainee 
must be given the opportunity to contest before a neutral decision-maker the factual basis for 
detention. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 509. As in Rasul, the Court afforded the detainee more 
process than is required under the law of armed conflict (but less than is afforded in a crimi-
nal trial). Moreover, the Hamdi Court questioned whether the law of armed conflict properly 
governs detentions in situations where “the practical circumstances . . . are entirely unlike 
those of the conflicts that informed [its] development.” Id. at 521. Recall that the Rasul Court 
itself underscored that the Guantánamo detentions were unlike detentions in more conven-
tional conflicts. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.  
  The Court’s fourth detainee decision, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004), pre-
sented the question of whether the government could detain a non-battlefield, U.S. citizen-
detainee captured in the United States. The Court, however, did not reach that question, and 
instead dismissed the petition for having been filed in the wrong jurisdiction. Id. at 451. For a 
comprehensive discussion of the Court’s detainee decisions, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & 
David J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction, Substantive Rights, and the War on Terror, 
120 HARV. L. REV. 2029 (2007).  
170 For a more extensive discussion on the failure of the U.S. Supreme Court even to look 
to the law of armed conflict for guidance, see W. Michael Reisman, Rasul v. Bush: A Failure 
to Apply International Law, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 973 (2004). 
171 Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, div. A, § 1005(e)(1), 119 Stat. 
2739, 2742 (to be codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. 801 (e)(1)); Military Commissions Act 
of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, sec. 7(a), 120 Stat. 2600, 2636 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 
2241(e)(1)).   
172 See infra notes 176-177 and accompanying text; Al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160, 183 
(4th Cir. 2007), petition for reh’g en banc granted, No. 06-7427 (4th Cir. Aug. 22, 2007) 
(concluding that the law of armed conflict does not govern the detention of a (foreign nation-
al) non-battlefield terrorism suspect captured in the United States and distinguishing Hamdi 
on the ground that, unlike in that case, the detainee at issue had no connection to a recogniz-
able battlefield).   
173 See Memorandum from Deputy Sec’y Def. to Sec’y Navy on Order Establishing Com-
batant Status Review Tribunals (July 7, 2004), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/ 
news/Jul2004/d20040707review.pdf. A separate process, the Administrative Review Boards, 
has been established to determine whether, once detained, persons may be released. See 
Order of Deputy Sec‘y Def., Administrative Review Procedures for Enemy Combatants in 
the Control of the Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba (May 11, 
2004), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/May2004/d20040518gtmoreview.pdf. 
2009] DETAINING TERRORISM SUSPECTS 639
sional legislation subjects CSRT determinations to limited review by the 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.174
 
In a July 2007 de-
cision in Bismullah v. Gates, a panel of that court found that, in order for its 
review of the CSRT determinations to be meaningful, counsel for the detai-
nees must have access to the information based on which their clients are 
detained, including in most cases classified information.175
 
At the time of 
this Article’s publication, the U.S. government has filed a petition for certi-
orari from the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Bismullah,176
 
and the U.S. Supreme 
Court is separately considering whether, now that the statutory basis for 
habeas jurisdiction has been overturned, federal courts have jurisdiction 
under the U.S. Constitution to review the legality of Guantánamo deten-
tions.177 
 
However those cases are resolved, the legal process available to 
Guantánamo detainees has become significantly more elaborate than any 
process formally required under the law of armed conflict.   
Nevertheless, that process continues to be flawed and fails to ensure 
that detention in each case is necessary. Under the CSRTs, detention is 
permitted if a suspect “was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaeda forces, 
or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States 
or its coalition partners.”178 
 
Detention thus is permitted based on a suspect’s 
potential affiliation and irrespective of whether detention is necessary to 
contain the security threat. For instance, by the government’s own account, 
detention would be permitted where a person unknowingly sent funds to a 
Qaeda-linked organization or where she taught a Qaeda member’s son.179
Moreover, the finding that the suspect was part of or supporting a transna-
tional jihadi group may be made based on a low, preponderance of evidence 
standard with a rebuttable presumption in favor of the government’s evi-
dence.180 
 
In practice, this low standard has enabled the government to main-




174 Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 § 1005(e)(2)(A), 119 Stat. at 2742. 
175 Bismullah v. Gates, 501 F.3d 178 (D.C. Cir. 2007); see also Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533 
(“We therefore hold that a citizen-detainee seeking to challenge his classification as an ene-
my combatant must receive notice of the factual basis for his classification and a fair oppor-
tunity to rebut the Government’s factual assertions before a neutral decisionmaker.”). 
176 Reply Brief for Petitioners-Appellants, Gates v. Bismullah, No. 07-1054 (U.S. Mar. 
2008), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/2007/2pet/7pet/2007-1054.pet.rep.html. 
177 Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 75 U.S.L.W. 3707  
(U.S. June 29, 2007) (No. 06-1195).  
178 See Memorandum from Deputy Sec’y Def., supra note 173. 
179 See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F.Supp.2d 443, 475 (D.D.C. 2005).  
180 See Bismullah, 501 F.3d at 181. 
181 See Denbeaux & Denbeaux, supra note 134, at 15-20 (reporting on evidence used in 
CSRTs and Administrative Review Boards). But cf. COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER, AN 
ASSESSMENT OF 516 COMBATANT STATUS REVIEW TRIBUNAL (CSRT) UNCLASSIFIED 
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tions have also continued long after detainees have been deemed eligible for 
release—and thus presumably after the government determined that deten-
tion was not (or was no longer) necessary.182
 
 
V. DEVELOPING COHERENT STANDARDS  
State practice thus illustrates that states reject detaining non-
battlefield terrorism suspects based on the law of armed conflict, but that 
they perceive a real need to contain the threat from at least some suspects 
outside the criminal process. States have employed a variety of extra-
criminal measures to satisfy that need. Some such measures were ad hoc 
and intended to circumvent (rather than to work within or to try to change) 
the law. But other measures—and specifically the measures of administra-
tive detention—were taken deliberately and with legislative and judicial 
participation. The use of these measures indicates that, although states have 
been willing to evade the law, they are groping to operate within it—that is, 
to develop alternative legal frameworks that satisfy their security needs.  
An alternative legal framework already exists under human rights 
law in the form of administrative detention. Yet in order for administrative 
detention to fill the void for a sustainable detention regime in the fight 
against terrorism, the law in this area must be further developed. Develop-
ing that law would serve two functions. It would inhibit states from exploit-
ing the current legal ambiguity to detain persons in ways that are unneces-
sary or insufficiently protective of individual liberties. And it would enable 
states—and particularly states that take seriously their human rights obliga-
tions, but also face a real threat from transnational jihadi terrorism—to de-
tain terrorism suspects outside the criminal process but based on a legal 
framework that establishes meaningful controls. It thus would curb the in-
centive to resort to ad hoc or uncontrolled measures.  
This Part outlines four policy goals to inform the development of 
law on security-based administrative detention as it applies in the fight 
against terrorism. First, detainees must be afforded prompt legal process, in 
which they have (at the very least) a meaningful opportunity to challenge, 
before a neutral arbiter, the facts giving rise to detention and to offer evi-
dence in rebuttal. Second, the standard of non-arbitrariness must be made 
more robust. Extended security-based detention should be considered non-
arbitrary only in narrowly defined circumstances: where the detainee him-
   
SUMMARIES (2007) (arguing that the Denbeaux and Denbeaux study has methodological 
flaws).   
182 See, e.g., 3 Detainees at Guantanamo Are Released to Albania, WASH. POST, Nov. 18, 
2006, at A13; Josh White & Julie Tate, 4 Men Cleared of Terrorism Links but Still Detained, 
WASH. POST, May 20, 2006, at A18; Craig Whitlock, 82 Inmates Cleared but Still Held at 
Guantanamo, WASH. POST, Apr. 29, 2007, at A1 (reporting that about eighty-five Guantána-
mo detainees have been deemed eligible for release).   
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self poses a serious security threat, where detention is necessary to contain 
that threat, and where it is designed to last no longer than necessary. Third, 
with that enhanced standard of non-arbitrariness, pure security-based deten-
tion should be permitted. And finally, any state that employs a system of 
administrative detention must define the boundaries between it and the 
criminal process.   
A.  Prompt and Meaningful Legal Process  
States must afford detainees prompt, fair, and meaningful legal 
process on the lawfulness of detention. The comprehensive human rights 
instruments all establish the requirement of judicial review,183 
 
and oversight 
bodies consistently underscore the importance of such review to check 
against capricious or unjustified detention.184 Moreover, the absence or in-
adequacy of judicial review has been the primary concern expressed by var-
ious human rights bodies with respect to U.S. detention practices.185 Those 
same concerns have animated the debate within the United States, and ulti-
mately have compelled the U.S. government to make the legal process at 
Guantánamo Bay more rigorous.186 The availability of meaningful legal 
process is critical because, unlike traditional combatants, terrorists operate 
by blending into the general population, and any counterterrorism detention 
regime thus is likely to target a relatively high number of innocents—
persons who are suspected of posing a threat but in fact do not. 
Legal process may be fair and meaningful even if detainees are not 
afforded the full panoply of safeguards that a state ordinarily affords crimi-
nal defendants. Many such safeguards reflect a state’s own legal and norma-
tive traditions and are not required by international law. Indeed, domestic 
criminal justice systems vary significantly across jurisdictions. Some states 
employ a standard of proof of beyond a reasonable doubt, but others use 
something closer to a preponderance of the evidence standard.187 Some ca-
tegorically exclude certain forms of evidence (such as hearsay or evidence 
obtained unlawfully), while others admit such evidence on the understand-
  
183 See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
184 See, e.g., U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Working Group on Arbitrary Deten-
tion, Civil and Political Rights, Including the Question of Torture and Detention, ¶¶ 77-78, 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/6 (Dec. 1, 2005); General Comment No. 29, supra note 51, ¶ 16; 
General Comment 8, supra note 72. 
185 See supra notes 122-125 and accompanying text. 
186 See supra notes 167-175 and accompanying text. 
187 See Thomas V. Mulrine, Reasonable Doubt: How in The World Is It Defined?, 12 AM. 
U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 195, 214-23 (1997) (comparing the standards of proof in criminal cases 
across jurisdictions); Michele Taruffo, Rethinking the Standards of Proof, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 
659, 665-69 (2003) (asserting that many civil code countries do not employ a criminal stan-
dard of proof of beyond a reasonable doubt).  
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ing that the adjudicator will take into account its potential unreliability.188  
Given this variance, no one system can be said to embody the best or only 
way to ensure criminal defendants fair legal process. Thus, the legal process 
afforded to administrative detainees might reasonably deviate from a state’s 
own rules of criminal procedure while still being fundamentally fair and 
consistent with international law.  
That said, it is extraordinarily difficult to identify with specificity 
the minimum legal process that should be permitted under a system of ad-
ministrative detention, and human rights law currently gives us little guid-
ance. Broadly speaking, terrorism suspects must have the prompt and mea-
ningful opportunity to challenge, before a neutral arbiter, the facts giving 
rise to detention and to offer evidence in rebuttal. The promptness require-
ment means that detainees must have at least a preliminary opportunity to 
contest their detentions within a matter of days, not months.189 This re-
quirement renders a system of administrative detention potentially more 
liberty-protecting than the criminal process because innocent terrorism sus-
pects may demonstrate within days that they do not pose a threat and that 
detention is therefore unwarranted—an option that may not exist to escape 
extended pretrial detention under the criminal process.190
 
 
The requirement that judicial review be meaningful entails at least 
three things. First, the reviewing body must have the authority to order the 
detainee’s release if it determines that detention is unjustified.191 Without 
  
188 ANDREW L.-T. CHOO, HEARSAY AND CONFRONTATION IN CRIMINAL TRIALS 34 (1996). 
Indeed, international criminal tribunals themselves admit evidence that would be inadmissi-
ble under the common law tradition. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Delali, Case No. IT-96-21-T, 
Decision on the Motion of Prosecution for Admissibility of Evidence, ¶ 16 (Jan. 19, 1998); 
Prosecutor v. Tadi, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on Defence Motion on Hearsay, ¶¶ 14, 19 
(Aug. 5, 1996); Richard May & Marieke Wierda, Trends in International Criminal Evidence: 
Nuremberg, Tokyo, The Hague, and Arusha, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 725, 745-53 
(1999). 
189 See General Comment 8, supra note 72, ¶ 2 (asserting that delays in bringing a detainee 
before a judge “must not exceed a few days”); see also NIHAL JAYAWICKRAMA, THE JUDICIAL 
APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: NATIONAL, REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL 
JURISPRUDENCE 40608 (2002). 
190 With respect to pretrial detention in the United States, see 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (2000) 
(permitting pretrial detention upon a judicial finding that “no condition or combination of 
conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of 
any other person and the community”). See also Kuckes, supra note 56, at 23 (“[R]outine 
pretrial criminal hearings . . . are not designed to test the issue that is most fundamental from 
a due process perspective—whether sufficient evidence of criminal wrongdoing exists to 
justify depriving the defendant of liberty and property interests pending trial.”). 
191 See ICCPR, supra note 51, art. 9(4) (providing for the court to decide on the lawfulness 
of detention “and order [the detainee’s] release if the detention is not lawful”); see also 
American Convention, supra note 51, art 7(6); ECHR, supra note 51, art. 5(4). The require-
ment that the reviewing body have the authority to order a detainee’s release if it determines 
that detention is unjustified may present practical complications for the detaining state (for 
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that authority, judicial review is vacuous. Second, the detainee must be 
equipped to participate in that process and to pursue her rights within it. 
This almost certainly requires legal counsel or some other form of indepen-
dent representation.192 
 
Finally, the detainee must be informed of the factual 
basis for detention and be given a genuine opportunity to respond. The D.C. 
Circuit in Bismullah and the Canadian Supreme Court in Charkaoui both 
underscored this point: a detainee cannot reasonably challenge the justifica-
tion for detention if it is not made available to her.193 States that rely on clas-
sified evidence to detain terrorism suspects thus must share either that evi-
dence or a substantial substitute with the detainee (or with her representa-
tive). This is a compromise approach. States may not invoke the existence 
of classified intelligence to obstruct a detainee’s opportunity for rebuttal, 
but they may protect intelligence information, sources, or methods in ways 
that may be impermissible under the criminal process. For instance, a state 
may design a system of administrative detention that permits it to keep clas-
sified some of the intelligence on which it relies; to share intelligence only 
with the detainee’s security-cleared representative, and not with the detainee 
herself; or to present statements from an intelligence source without afford-
ing the detainee an opportunity to confront that source in person on the ve-
racity of his statements.  
B.  Non-Arbitrariness  
Judicial review and the other procedural constraints on detention are 
critical, but they are only as protective as the underlying substantive stan-
dards based on which detention is permitted. Thus, the procedural con-
straints are not sufficient on their own to prevent abuse. Part III demonstrat-
ed, however, that the current substantive constraints on administrative de-
tention are insufficient in the security context. These constraints must be 
adjusted with non-battlefield detentions in mind. Specifically, such deten-
tion should be lawful only where the detainee himself poses a serious secu-
rity threat, where detention is necessary to contain that threat, and where 
detention is calibrated to last no longer than necessary.  
First, in order for security-based detention to be non-arbitrary, the 
detainee himself must pose a serious security threat. This proposition is 
supported by the jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee on deten-
   
example, if the detainee is not a national or resident of the detaining state, and return to his 
home country would create a substantial risk of mistreatment). That requirement nevertheless 
is essential for judicial review to be meaningful. States that engage in security-based deten-
tion thus should develop in advance plans for releasing detainees for whom detention is 
deemed unjustified. 
192 See supra note 76. 
193 See supra notes 151, 175 and accompanying text.  
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tions outside the security context, and by its conversation with Israel on the 
detention of “bargaining chips.”194
 
Moreover, one of the criticisms voiced 
against the CSRT process at Guantánamo Bay is that it permits detention for 
anyone who has supported al Qaeda or associated forces without requiring 
any individualized assessment of threat.195
 
Not everyone who supports al 
Qaeda or other transnational jihadi groups poses the state targets of those 
groups a sufficiently serious threat to warrant security-based detention. For 
instance, a Pakistani villager who attends a Qaeda training camp may tech-
nically be a member of al Qaeda, but if he does nothing more, he poses 
western governments no real security threat, and his detention by those gov-
ernments would therefore be unjustifiable.196
 
Indeed, his detention would 
probably be unjustifiable even if he had intelligence information that those 
governments would consider useful. International law and practice do not 
appear to condone administrative detention for the purpose of obtaining 
intelligence where the detainee himself poses no security threat.197
 
And, in 
any event, a system of detention designed primarily to obtain intelligence 
would require a different balance between liberty and security than the bal-
ance achieved in a system designed to contain persons who themselves pose 
a threat.  
International law must, therefore, establish standards for identifying 
when a non-battlefield terrorism suspect poses a sufficiently serious security 
threat to render his detention non-arbitrary. For guidance, international law-
yers might look to the treatment by the law of armed conflict of civilians 
who participate in the fighting.198
 
Under the law of armed conflict, civilians 
may not be the object of military attack, but they lose that immunity from 
attack “for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.”199  There con-
  
194 See supra notes 106-108 and accompanying text. 
195 See supra note 178 and accompanying text; see also James G. Stewart, Rethinking 
Guantánamo: Unlawful Confinement as Applied in International Criminal Law, 4 J. INT'L 
CRIM. JUST. 12, 23-25 (2006). 
196 The law of armed conflict contains no similar requirement for an individualized assess-
ment of threat and instead permits detention based on association. Under that law, member-
ship in the armed forces of a party, or even in a civilian-run organization aimed at causing 
disturbances, is a sufficient basis for detention. See Geneva Convention III, supra note 34, 
art. 4(A); COMMENTARY: IV GENEVA CONVENTION, supra note 43, at 258.  
197 See Pejic, supra note 52, at 380 (“[I]nternment or administrative detention for the sole 
purpose of intelligence gathering, without the person involved otherwise presenting a real 
threat to State security, cannot be justified.”). 
198 Cf. Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, International Law, U.S. War Powers, and the Glob-
al War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2653, 2655-58 (2005) (discussing the direct partici-
pation standard in the context of U.S. detentions based on the Congressional authorization to 
use military force in response to the September 11 attacks). 
199 Additional Protocol I, supra note 34, art. 51(3) (applicable in international armed con-
flicts); Additional Protocol II, supra note 34, art. 13(3) (applicable in certain non-
 
2009] DETAINING TERRORISM SUSPECTS 645
tinues to be some ambiguity as to what constitutes “direct participation” for 
purposes of the loss of civilian immunity.200
 
But civilians generally are un-
derstood to lose their immunity when preparing for or returning from com-
bat and when providing logistical support or target information for imme-
diate use.201 
 
By contrast, civilians maintain their immunity when involved 
in the war effort without themselves posing any threat—for example when 
working in a manufacturing plant that produces materiel for use in the 
war.202 
 
If the law on the loss of civilian immunity is adjusted for non-
battlefield detentions, persons who organize or direct attacks, or who are 
preparing to commit an attack, might be candidates for detention by the 
state-targets of those activities. By contrast, persons who provide only fi-
nancial support to a terrorist organization, or who express a passing com-
mitment to jihad (without doing anything more), might not. The reason for 
the distinction is that the latter suspects—those who do not or who only 
indirectly participate in attacks—do not themselves pose a security threat 
warranting detention, although their activities may warrant criminal sanc-
tion203 or liberty-restricting measures short of detention.  
The determination that someone poses a serious security threat is 
not easily reviewed by international human rights bodies. As was demon-
strated in Part III, neither the Human Rights Committee nor the European 
Court of Human Rights seriously examines such determinations. These bo-
dies are not equipped or authorized to make those determinations de novo, 
but their review nevertheless may be made more probing. For example, in 
Ahani and Chahal, the two bodies could have—and should have—examined 
more carefully the domestic standards under which the detentions were au-
thorized. The same is true of the Human Rights Committee’s review of the 
systems for pure security-based detention in India and Israel, and at Guan-
tánamo Bay. In this context, the reasonable belief standard may justify 
short- but not long-term detention. A state looking to engage in extended 
detention should be required to demonstrate more than simply a reasonable 
belief or suspicion that the suspect poses a threat—a substantive standard 
   
international armed conflicts); see also HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 49, at 
19-24 (applicable as a matter of customary international law). 
200 See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War 
on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2115-16 n.306 (2005). 
201 See BOTHE, PARTSCH & SOLF, supra note 28, at 301-04; COMMENTARY ON ADDITIONAL 
PROTOCOLS, supra note 39, at 618-19. 
202 See BOTHE, PARTSCH & SOLF, supra note 28, at 301-04; COMMENTARY ON ADDITIONAL 
PROTOCOLS, supra note 39, at 618-19. 
203 See, e.g., International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, 
Dec. 9, 1999, 39 I.L.M. 270 (requiring states to criminalize the financing of acts of terror-
ism); S.C. Res. 1373, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001) (same).   
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akin to the one under the law of armed conflict and insufficiently protective 
of the detainees’ liberty interests in the fight against terrorism.  
Second, for security-based detention to be non-arbitrary, it must be 
necessary to contain the threat or to meet the other government interests 
being pursued. Detention presumably is unnecessary if those interests may 
be satisfied by less restrictive alternatives. States therefore should be re-
quired to consider the availability of such alternatives before they engage in 
administrative detention, and particularly in extended such detention. Where 
detention serves more than one interest—for instance, where pre-charge 
detention serves both a preventative interest in containing the threat and a 
criminal justice interest in preventing flight or investigating the offense—
then it is reasonable for a state to consider both of those interests in assess-
ing the availability of alternatives. But if those interests may be satisfied by 
less restrictive alternatives, states should be required to employ them. Such 
alternatives may include, for example, restrictions on movement or on 
access to particular services, as under the 2005 British legislation.204
 
 
Finally, the standard of non-arbitrariness should be interpreted to 
prohibit detentions from lasting any longer than necessary. The procedural 
mechanism for this is periodic judicial review.205
 
As a substantive matter, 
however, it may be extraordinarily difficult to identify the point at which 
detention is no longer necessary, i.e., to determine whether a person who 
has been detained for some time would again pose a threat if released. Nev-
ertheless, the duration of detention must be contained.206  Detention enables 
a state to disrupt ongoing terrorist activity and, if appropriate, to develop a 
more considered criminal case. It may also remove a suspect from the 
“game” by putting him and others on notice that he is of interest to the au-
thorities and thus rendering him unattractive as a future operative.207 Over 
time, those interests that justify detention become less paramount and give 
way to the liberty interests against detention. The detaining state therefore 
should be required to satisfy increasingly stringent evidentiary standards to 
  
204 See supra notes 162-164 and accompanying text. 
205  See, e.g., Human Rights Comm., Communication No. 1090/2002: New Zealand, ¶ 7.3, 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/D/1090/2002 (Nov. 6, 2003) (underscoring the importance of “regu-
lar periodic reviews of the individual case by an independent body, in order to determine the 
continued justification of detention for purposes of protection of the public”); Human Rights 
Comm., Concluding Observations: Republic of Moldova, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc.CCPR/CO/75/MD 
A (2002) (asserting that “the detention of persons awaiting trial should also be reviewed 
periodically”); Assenov v. Bulgaria, 28 Eur. H.R. Rep. 652, 690 (1998) (“[A] detained per-
son must be able to take proceedings at reasonable intervals before a court to challenge the 
lawfulness of his detention where the nature of the deprivation of liberty under consideration 
would require it.”); cf. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 34, art. 43 (requiring periodic 
review of the detention of protected persons in armed conflicts).  
206  Cf. supra note 112 and accompanying text.  
207 See THIRD CARLILE REPORT, supra note 165, at 17. 
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hold a suspect beyond incrementally set periods. For instance, short-term 
detention might be permitted on a reasonable belief standard, but to contin-
ue the detention in the medium- and long-term, the state would have to 
demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence or by clear and convincing 
evidence that detention continues to be warranted.208
 
Moreover, after a cer-
tain point (for example, two years), all or almost all detainees must be re-
leased, deported, or criminally prosecuted. To the extent that detention 
beyond that point is ever justifiable, it is justifiable only in truly exceptional 
cases—for instance, where a state has demonstrated by clear and convincing 
evidence that a suspect would pose a particularly serious security threat if 
released.  
C.  Form of Administrative Detention  
With that enhanced standard of non-arbitrariness in place, pure se-
curity-based detention should be permitted.209
 
States gravitate toward predi-
cating detention on criminal or immigration proceedings because those 
forms of detention satisfy a variety of interests (i.e., punishment or deporta-
tion, in addition to containing the security threat) and are relatively well 
  
208 For purposes of comparison, the (indefinite) civil commitment of persons who are men-
tally ill is constitutionally permitted in the United States so long as both mental illness and 
dangerousness are established by at least clear and convincing evidence. See Addington v. 
Texas, 441U.S. 418 (1979); see also Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983) (upholding 
indefinite civil commitment of a mentally ill person where it was established beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that he committed a criminal act and by a preponderance of the evidence that 
he had a mental illness).   
209 For instance, detention is already permitted in the United States to protect the public 
from other hazards, including the spread of infectious diseases and dangerous acts committed 
by the mentally ill or by sex offenders. For a review of such non-criminal, preventative de-
tention in the United States, see Tung Yin, Ending the War on Terrorism One Terrorist at a 
Time: A Noncriminal Detention Model for Holding and Releasing Guantanamo Bay Detai-
nees, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 149, 183-88 (2005). The purpose of such detention, like 
that of security-based administrative detention, is not to punish for past acts, but to protect 
the public from some prospective danger (and sometimes also to rehabilitate the detainee). 
Notably, the U.S. Supreme Court has suggested that the preventative detention of terrorism 
suspects may sometimes be lawful. In Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), the Court 
construed a statute on immigration detention not to permit indefinite detention because it was 
not sufficiently narrowly tailored. The Court explained that “[t]he provision authorizing 
detention does not apply narrowly to ‘a small segment of particularly dangerous individuals,’ 
say, suspected terrorists, but broadly to aliens ordered removed for many and various rea-
sons . . . .” Id. at 691 (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added). This language suggests 
that indefinite immigration detention might be lawful in the United States if it is narrowly 
tailored, for example, to apply only to certain terrorism suspects. More recently, during the 
oral argument in Boumediene v. Bush, Justice Breyer suggested that Congress might have the 
authority to design a narrowly tailored system of preventative detention to contain terrorism 
suspects outside the immigration context. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 39, 47, 54, 
Boumediene v. Bush, (2007) No. 06-1195.  
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accepted in international law and practice. Yet detention predicated on fu-
ture criminal or immigration proceedings may convert informally into pure 
security-based detention, without adequate controls.210
 
Moreover, such de-
tention may fail to satisfy the security and liberty interests at stake in the 
fight against terrorism.   
For instance, security-based immigration detention responds only to 
a fraction of the state’s security needs because it permits detention only of 
foreign nationals and only until the date of deportation. It therefore does not 
address the threat posed by a state’s own nationals or by foreign nationals 
outside its jurisdiction, even though the security threat from both groups 
may be considerable.211 Such detention may also fail to protect the relevant 
liberty interests. Detention pending deportation is generally designed as a 
short-term measure, so the standard for detention is often quite low.212  In 
the counterterrorism context, however, deportation proceedings may be-
come protracted or infeasible because of the risk of home-country mistreat-
ment. States that hinge security-based detention on deportation proceedings 
thus may engage in extended detention without any rigorous demonstration 
of necessity. If states were instead permitted to develop systems of pure 
security-based detention, they could make detention decisions on the basis 
of the severity of the threat (and not only on the nationality of the suspect), 
but such decisions would be subject to controls that are unnecessary where 
the goal of deportation is immediately realizable. In other words, pure secu-
rity-based detention would enable states to better satisfy the liberty and se-
curity interests at stake in this context.  
D.  Relationship to the Criminal Law  
Finally, states that employ security-based administrative detention 
must define the boundaries between it and the criminal process so that legal 
standards govern who is processed through which system and when.213 
 
In-
ternational law and practice currently provide almost no guidance on this 
  
210 See supra Part III. 
211 A v. Home Secretary [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 A.C. 68, ¶¶ 33-35 (questioning the 
extent to which immigration detention responds to the alleged threat, especially given the 
potential threat posed by a state’s own nationals). 
212 The U.K. legislation at issue in A. v. Home Secretary and the Canadian legislation sus-
tained in Charkaoui both permit extended detention under a reasonable belief standard. Id. ¶ 
2; see Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, 2001 S.C., ch. 27, § 82 (Can.). 
213 For example, the U.S. government has been criticized for transferring detainees between 
the criminal and the armed-conflict systems without clear standards or controls. See John Ip, 
Comparative Perspectives on the Detention of Terrorist Suspects, 16 TRANSNAT'L L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 773, 811 (2007); Jesselyn A. Raddack, You Say Defendant, I Say Comba-
tant: Opportunistic Treatment of Terrorism Suspects Held in the United States and the Need 
for Due Process, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 525, 526-28 (2005). 
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issue, and the questions posed are not easily answered. One question is 
whether administrative detention should be a last resort that is available 
only when the criminal law is not, or whether the availability of the criminal 
law should be irrelevant. The United Kingdom’s 2005 legislation leans to-
ward the former approach. Because the government must consider filing 
criminal charges against anyone subject to pure security-based detention, 
extended detention is permitted in the United Kingdom only when the crim-
inal process is deemed unavailable.214
 
A second question relates to the pro-
cedures for prosecuting persons who have previously been detained admini-
stratively. Should these persons be tried under the state’s ordinary rules of 
criminal procedure, or should states develop different rules to facilitate ter-
rorism-related prosecutions? For instance, where an administrative detainee 
is interrogated without the procedural safeguards afforded to criminal de-
fendants, should the information obtained be admissible in a subsequent 
criminal trial, even if it would not be admissible in the trial of a more ordi-
nary criminal defendant? Section II.C argued that states that deviate in the 
counterterrorism context from their ordinary rules of criminal law or proce-
dure risk contaminating their criminal justice systems more generally. Yet a 
number of states have already developed special rules of criminal procedure 




International practice demonstrates that, although most states have 
declined to detain non-battlefield terrorism suspects based on the law of 
armed conflict, many are looking for options for incapacitating these sus-
pects outside the criminal process. The bipolar paradigm for thinking about 
non-battlefield detentions—as armed-conflict or criminal—is out of step 
with that practice and is mistaken as a matter of law. Human rights law 
permits administrative detention for reasons of national security, subject to 
important constraints. Those constraints are not now sufficient in the coun-
terterrorism context. But if the law in this area is developed, administrative 
detention may strike the most appropriate balance between liberty and secu-
rity for certain categories of terrorism detainees. 
This Article articulates four broad policy goals for developing the 
law on security-based administrative detention in the fight against terrorism. 
First, detainees must be afforded prompt and meaningful legal process. 
  
214 See supra notes 162-164 and accompanying text. 
215 For examples of states that employ special rules of criminal law or procedure in terror-
ism cases, see, for example, supra notes 144-147 and accompanying text (France); STRAW, 
supra note 141, ¶ 93 (noting Spain’s “adaptations of normal procedures” in “terrorist and 
organized crime cases”); and C.H. Powell, Terrorism and Governance in South Africa and 
Eastern Africa, in GLOBAL ANTITERRORISM LAW & POLICY, supra note 57, at 555, 574-75 
(noting relaxed rules of evidence in terrorism cases in Tanzania, Uganda, and Kenya).  
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Second, extended administrative detention is permissible only in specified 
circumstances—i.e., where the detainee himself poses a serious security 
threat, where detention is necessary to contain that threat, and where deten-
tion lasts no longer than necessary. Third, in those circumstances, security-
based detention need not be tied to other legal proceedings, such as future 
criminal trial or deportation. And finally, any state that employs a system of 
administrative detention must carefully define the boundaries between it and 
the ordinary criminal process.  
In articulating these policy goals, this Article does not purport to of-
fer a comprehensive legislative scheme. Much still must be done to refine 
the international legal rules and to implement them domestically. This Ar-
ticle does, however, argue for shifting the debate to those questions and 
away from the stale armed-conflict-or-criminal divide. This shift is impera-
tive. Transnational jihadi terrorism is here to stay, and it will increasingly be 
fought away from any conventional battlefield. In the absence of any legal 
template for dealing with non-battlefield suspects, states must choose be-
tween exposing themselves to devastating attacks and pursuing uncontrolled 
or ill-suited measures to contain the threat. Neither path is sustainable.  
 
